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The Federal Republic of Germany has arisen to take a leadership position in the Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis.  This quasi depression has highlighted the economic 
interdependence of the Eurozone member states and has exposed the fundamental 
weakness of the lack of a political union between members to coordinate a timely fiscal 
response.  This thesis examines why the Federal Republic of Germany became the 
cornerstone for Eurozone monetary stability; how the country contributed and what it has 
sacrificed thus far towards the crisis; and surveys what Germany must do in the future to 
ensure European financial stability. 
Germany’s current commitment to the continent is examined here through the 
treaties that economically linked the European nations and formed the foundation for the 
Eurozone.  In addition, the weaknesses of periphery member states that contributed to the 
crisis and the substantial sovereign economic bailouts and recovery packages that have 
been enacted by the Troika are analyzed. 
The thesis then examines the three options that are available to the Eurozone: to 
continue to “muddle through” the crisis, to enact substantial reforms, or to splinter and 
break-up the Union.  The results support the choice for greater political integration and 
the need for the issuance of Eurobonds. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
On 1 January 1999, a new era began for the European Union with the introduction 
of the euro currency and the implementation of the Eurozone.1  At the same time, and 
without the benefit of hindsight to reveal the future implications, this event posed a 
significant parting of the ways for the entrenched political values and economic 
principles of Germany.  The decision to create this new economic union took place at a 
time when Germany was in the rigors of reunification, and created an environment where 
observers could poorly foresee the impact that future economic challenges would have in 
the euphoria attendant to the end of the Cold War.  On the opening day of 1999, 
participating members ceased their sovereign rights to their national currencies and began 
an age of monetary interdependence as part of the ongoing reconstruction of Europe that 
had begun in the 1950s, if not before.  Eight short years later the honeymoon period of 
economic unity came to a screeching halt with the spread of the global economic 
recession of 2007–2008. The exponentially increasing burden on member states soon 
created a financial crisis for those Eurozone members on the periphery of the union, most 
notably Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain (GIIPS), and later Cyprus, who attempted 
to manage the accumulation of massive and unsustainable deficits.  This rise of 
unprecedented public debt levels ultimately triggered a Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. 
This crisis highlighted the economic interdependence of the Eurozone members 
and quickly divided the union into those countries who were financially stable and those 
who were not.  In addition, the crisis exposed a weakness of the economic union, as it 
demonstrated an underlying lack of a political union between members to coordinate a 
timely fiscal response.  As a result, the lack of political will in individual member states 
to take the necessary measures at the initial signs of fiscal problems allowed the situation 
to grow into a crisis that threatens the continued existence of the Eurozone and the 
                                                 
1 On 1 January 1999, the euro currency was implemented for non-cash transactions; on 1 January 
2002, euro notes and coins became legal tender. 
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common currency.  This lack of a unified response demonstrated that this debt crisis was 
as much about politics as it was about economics. 
The country that eventually arose to take a leadership position in the Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis has been the united Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).  This 
unanticipated role has developed as the country continues to integrate itself with some 
skill and adeptness into a globalized economy via its imperative of the social market 
economy and exports of high quality manufactured goods.  German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel has clearly stated that Germany is “‘deeply committed’ to the euro zone and 
‘determined to do everything to protect it.’”2  The leadership’s unwavering commitment 
to defend the European economic union may be examined and analyzed as this study 
proposes to do.  In doing so, a research question may be proposed:  Why has the 
government of Germany volunteered to become the cornerstone for Eurozone monetary 
stability, how has the country contributed and what has it sacrificed thus far towards the 
crisis, and what must Germany do in the future to ensure European financial stability?  In 
addition, what in the past explains this development and what stresses and strains in the 
fabric of Europe, and its nations among themselves, explains this startling and significant 
phenomenon? 
B. IMPORTANCE  
The financial meltdown of 2007–2008, which originated in the United States, 
quickly became a threat to the global economy. As after 1929, nowhere was this collapse 
felt more than in the Eurozone countries.  Those European states that had only recently 
come to prosperity in the boom of the 1990s, and which had intensified their liberal fiscal 
policies during the growth period of the early days of the euro, soon realized they had 
created unsustainable public debts when income and credit faded.  Unlike nations with 
independent monetary policies, Eurozone members were limited in what they could do to 
counter the negative fiscal trends in their constrained union.  Harder hit members, which 
in the past may have chosen the option to devalue their currency, no longer had the 
                                                 
2 Brian Blackstone and Charles Forelle, “Germany, France Back Pledge to Save Euro,” The Wall 
Street Journal, July 27, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443931404577552920809640442.html. 
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ability to perform this measure.  Instead nations had to enact strict and unpopular 
austerity measures to counter their rising sovereign debt.  This solution, in turn, quickly 
led to a decrease in demand in the domestic markets and created barriers for economic 
growth.  As a result, economic hardships persisted that soon gave rise to nationwide riots 
and the subsequent toppling of several state governments. 
The sovereign debt crisis spawned the possibility for the collapse of the Eurozone.  
The consequence of this possible economic failure, which still exists today, would send 
shockwaves throughout the largest trading and monetary union of modern times and 
would severely hinder the continued recovery of the recent worldwide recession.  The 
main facilitator in thwarting this seemingly inevitable collapse was the German 
intervention in the crisis.  This country, which only 68 years ago was physically, 
emotionally, and economically devastated after two World Wars, rose to become the 
pivotal member state of the Eurozone. 
The Federal Republic of Germany’s transformation in the post-World War II 
period has allowed the country to become a leader in the Eurozone.  The nation was able 
to effectively rebuild its economy in the postwar period, endure its position on the front 
lines of the Cold War, and successfully incorporate the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) state once the Soviet Union collapsed.  Any of these hurdles could have prevented 
the reemergence of a strong and viable domestic economy and instead could have created 
an unstable and factious land in Central Europe.  In addition, the German nation survived 
the fiscal collapse and inflationary explosion of the years between the two World Wars, 
and as a result, ever since rebuilding began in the country this harsh lesson has ingrained 
itself in monetary policy.  The values and economic discipline that Germany enacted has 
allowed the nation to endure the Eurozone crisis and positioned the country to rightfully 
demand strict austerity measures on weaker member states. 
The enduring fiscal instability of the peripheral Eurozone member nations 
continues to pressure the European Union and threatens the future of the Eurozone.  The 
crisis has strained relations among European leaders and institutions, and created an 
opening for the rise of political extremism and for the creation of factions within member 
governments.  As Germany has previously taken the leadership role in the crisis, the 
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country has the opportunity to use its strong fiscal position to ensure European financial 
stability.  Germany has the monetary means, economic clout, and proven track record to 
deliver a rapid and overwhelming resolution to the Eurozone crisis. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The research question examines the political aspects of this economic crisis.  In 
doing so, a solid background of the principles of economic theory and policy must be 
presented.  The economic discussion of the Eurozone crisis must include an examination 
of what caused the financial crisis and the instruments available to resolve the situation.  
This will include a study of the forces that led to the crisis, including the propensity to 
overlend and overborrow, the global economic recession, the limitation of exchange rate 
manipulation, the pressures of short-term debt, and the possibility of European contagion.  
In examining the ways to resolve the Eurozone crisis, the two types of relief that may be 
utilized include rescue packages and debt restructuring.  In enacting these two types of 
resolutions, the possibility of moral hazard and a free-rider problem must be considered.  
Finally, recent changes and proposed future solutions for the crisis may be discussed, 
which include increased bank regulation and supervision, and the use of capital controls.3 
An additional investigation of the political decisions and those who make the 
economic choices must be evaluated.  This will be highlighted with the evolution of the 
German leadership’s decision to defend and save the Eurozone at any cost.  In examining 
the country’s role in the financial crisis, other key players may be observed in relation to 
the decision-making process, including the leadership of the European Central Bank and 
the leadership of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Germany’s commitment to the continent may be examined through the treaties 
that economically linked the European nations and formed the foundation for the current 
Eurozone.  These include the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty of 1951, the 
European Economic Community established in 1957, and the Single European Act of 
1986.  In addition, the 1992 Maastricht treaty, and the Lisbon treaty signed in 2007,  
 
                                                 
3 Thomas A. Pugel, International Economics (New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2009), 526–39. 
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formed the origin of the modern EU and the euro currency.  Studying the progression of 
European financial integration will assist in understanding Germany’s obligation to the 
Eurozone. 
Another area of analysis will include the role of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) in the sovereign debt crisis and the institution’s relationship with Germany.  In 
unison with Germany, the ECB’s leadership has also stated that the bank will do 
“whatever it takes to preserve the euro as a stable currency.”4  The strong connection 
displayed between one of the 17 member states and the supranational organization will be 
examined.  Furthermore, the recent disagreement between the ECB and German 
leadership over the bank’s new fiscal policies will be investigated. 
In addition to Germany’s interaction with the European Central Bank, 
consideration must be given to the country’s connection with the other Eurozone states.  
This discussion will include an analysis of the differences in the economic mentality 
between Germany and the periphery states, and how this divergence has led to current 
conditions.  The monetary assistance that the German nation state has rendered to the 
weaker member states has been somewhat ungratefully received due to the inclusion of 
required austerity measures.  This examination will highlight the political repercussions 
of the ongoing economic crisis. 
Next, the domestic benefits and consequences of Eurozone membership and the 
effects from the continuing financial crisis will be examined.  Germany has experienced 
superior productivity growth and lower labor costs in relation to the weaker member 
states.  The country enjoys current account surpluses and moderate Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita growth, in large part due to the inclusion of the diverse 
economies within the monetary union.  This has given the German nation state an 
economic benefit that it would not have realized as a separate country. 
Finally, the most important issue for the future of the Eurozone is Germany’s 
decision to stay in or to exit the Union.  Either choice will have consequences beyond the 
                                                 
4 Mario Draghi, “Introductory Statement to the Press Conference (with Q&A),” European Central 
Bank, August 2, 2012, http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120802.en.html.  
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nation state and will have a profound impact for decades to come.  Historical factors and 
current influences will both be discussed for the two choices available to Germany. 
Given the literature review conducted, the hypothesis submitted is as follows:  
Due to the ingrained memories of the violent history of the country and the subsequent 
beliefs that arose in the aftermath, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany 
has undertook the leadership role and has become the cornerstone for Eurozone monetary 
stability, and will continue this role until long-term stability prevails. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
An examination of the Federal Republic of Germany in the post-World War II era 
provides insight into the country’s conservative economic behavior.  Two books provide 
a comprehensive study of Germany’s success following the Second World War.  These 
include Patrick Boarman’s Germany’s Economic Dilemma: Inflation and the Balance of 
Payments, published in 1964, and William Wadbrook’s West German Balance-of-
Payments Policy: The Prelude to European Monetary Integration, released in 1972.5  
These books discuss the Federal Republic of Germany’s monetary and fiscal policies that 
were created to fervently combat inflation and address the early challenges of a balance 
of payments surplus.  The authors also discuss the goals and policy interests of the 
German financial sector, including the long-term potential impact, and the mentality of 
government and Bundesbank leadership that continues to resonate today. 
Numerous books have recently been published detailing the causes and effects of 
the European financial crisis.  As this issue is still transpiring, later books include the 
most recent political and economic measures that have been implemented and discuss the 
consequences of continuing relief packages.  One such work, Coping with Crisis: 
Government Reactions to the Great Recession, which was published in 2012, starts at the 
broad perspective of examining the origins of the global economic crisis and quickly 
narrows down to the causes of Europe’s sovereign debt crisis and the actions taken in 
                                                 
5 Patrick M. Boarman, Germany’s Economic Dilemma: Inflation and the Balance of Payments (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964); William Pollard Wadbrook, West German Balance-of-Payments 
Policy: The Prelude to European Monetary Integration (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972).  
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response.6  This book discusses the Eurozone recovery plan initiated at the institutional 
level, but also succinctly discusses the choices that Germany was presented with and the 
decisions the country has made in response.  The last two chapters of the book provide a 
valuable insight into the consequences of the debt crisis, present the political 
opportunities that have been created, and discuss the underlying negative effect of the 
welfare state that is prevalent within the peripheral Eurozone countries. 
Raymond Converse’s Fiscal Crisis and World Order, which was published in 
2012, provides a valuable insight into how the debt crisis currently affects the European 
Union and provides some alternative outlooks of what the Eurozone may look like after 
the crisis has passed.7  The book provides a comprehensive examination of the multiple 
relief packages enacted to date in the attempt to combat the debt crisis.  In addition, the 
book discusses the constraints of the existing treaties and the underlying weaknesses 
within the political systems of the peripheral states that currently hamper an expeditious 
recovery.  As the author astutely states, “The solution in the case of the EU…will be 
found in some combination of disciplined spending behavior, increased revenue 
production from a couple of different sources, and a rational program for the stimulation 
of the economy.”8  The book also discusses the implications if Germany were to exit the 
Eurozone and introduces the distinct possibility of an undesirable Russian-German 
partnership. 
Another comprehensive piece on the economic and political aspects of the 
Eurozone crisis is Matthew Lynn’s book Bust: Greece, the Euro, and the Sovereign Debt 
Crisis, which was published in 2011.9  This work incorporates a solid background of the 
formation of the economic union and discusses the fundamental weaknesses inherent 
within the ensuing treaties.  In addition, the book discusses the relationships within, and 
between nations, that have contributed to the current crisis.  This book also has a 
                                                 
6 Nancy Bermeo and Jonas Pontusson, eds., Coping with Crisis: Government Reactions to the Great 
Recession (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2012). 
7 Raymond W. Converse, Fiscal Crisis and World Order (New York: Algora Publishing, 2012). 
8 Ibid., 92–93. 
9 Matthew Lynn, Bust: Greece, the Euro, and the Sovereign Debt Crisis (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., 2011). 
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thorough account of the behind-the-scenes political negotiations that produced the initial 
rescue packages and devotes a chapter to understanding the German perspective, 
including discussing its past experiences and its current beliefs and economic principles.  
The author also proposes the need to disband the Eurozone and discusses what the global 
economy would look like if this occurs. 
The Eurozone sovereign debt crisis can also be studied from a government 
perspective outside the European Union.  The United States publishes research conducted 
for the U.S. Congress, via the Congressional Research Service (CRS), and releases 
transcripts and prepared statements from Congressional Hearings.  Two valuable CRS 
reports include “The Eurozone Crisis: Overview and Issues for Congress,” released on 25 
March 2013, and “Sovereign Debt in Advanced Economies: Overview and Issues for 
Congress,” released on 31 January 2013.  In addition, recent pertinent Congressional 
Hearings include “The Future of the Eurozone: Outlook and Lessons,” before the Senate 
Subcommittee on European Affairs, convened on 1 August 2012, and “The Eurozone 
Crisis: Destabilizing the Global Economy,” before the House Subcommittee on Europe 
and Eurasia, conducted on 27 October 2011.  These reports and testimony convey a 
plethora of background information, current statistics, and expert opinions of what caused 
the debt crisis and what are the current political dynamics and future prospects for the 
Eurozone.  These resources also shed insight into various prominent U.S. political 
leaders’ perceptions of the crisis, including future Secretary of State and then Senator 
John Kerry’s remarks, and the opinions of the chairman and leading members of both 
subcommittees. 
Another source that provides a current examination of the Eurozone crisis 
includes the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), a nonprofit, nonpartisan 
economic research organization that releases the NBER working paper series.  The first 
relevant paper is “Fiscal Devaluations,” which examines other conventional fiscal 
instruments that may be utilized when a country cannot devalue its exchange rate.  This 
component is a main constraint for euro currency countries in the continuing sovereign 
debt crisis, as nations such as Greece and Italy cannot devalue their currency to help 
improve their fiscal position.  This paper introduces the option for a uniform increase in 
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import tariffs and export subsidies, and the prospect for a value-added tax increase and a 
uniform payroll tax reduction.  The political complications of implementing these 
policies are discussed, as well as the value of Germany pursuing these measures in 
relation to the agreement of future relief packages.  Another applicable paper is “A Tale 
of Politically-Failing Single-Currency Area,” which aptly describes the causes of the 
Eurozone crisis and details the unique constraints of a “politically weakly integrated 
system.”10  This article discusses the supranational aspect of the Eurozone and the 
limitations that member states have in conducting fiscal policy.  The paper also analyzes 
the political aspects of the unintended power that the European Central Bank has over 
member states. 
Other applicable research organizations that publish relevant Eurozone articles 
include the German Economic Review and Deutsche Bank DB Research.  The article 
“Controlled Dismantlement of the Eurozone: A Strategy to Save the European Union and 
the Single European Market,” released in 2013, addresses the problems with a single 
currency in Europe and the political consequences that may occur when member 
countries attempt to pursue internal devaluation.  The article gives a succinct explanation 
of the factors that led to the debt crisis and presents solid arguments, and counter-
arguments, for a dismantlement of the Eurozone.  DB Research, under its “Focus 
Germany” research theme, has produced valuable and timely articles, including “Euro 
crisis brings economy to a standstill in the winter half,” and “Gradual improvement in 
2013.”  Both of these articles provide critical economic statistics and present current 
trends and future forecasts for the country.  The article “Germany at the Polls: The 2013 
Elections and the Future of the Euro” delivers an in-depth analysis of the current political 
situation in Germany and discusses the policy implications of different coalitions coming 
to power in the elections scheduled for fall 2013. 
In addition to economic institutions, two important resources that will provide 
insight into German foreign policy issues are The German Council on Foreign Relations 
                                                 
10 Assaf Razin and Steven Rosefielde, “A Tale of Politically-Failing Single-Currency Area” (working 
paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 2012), 124, 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18352.  
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(DGAP) and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).  Both of 
these sources provide analytical papers and promote public debate on current German 
issues and include numerous articles on the current sovereign debt crisis. These two 
sources will provide a German perspective on the political aspect of the Eurozone crisis. 
A final noteworthy institutional publication is the annual Transatlantic Trends 
survey released by the German Marshall Fund of the United States.  The 2012 edition 
includes a critical assessment of the European economy and the continuing euro crisis, 
and discusses the upcoming economic and foreign policy challenges for the continent.  
The issue also includes an insight into the public opinion of the euro and the approval 
levels of the economic and political institutions within the Union. 
A vast resource of current material is also available from leading economic news 
agencies, including the Financial Times, The New York Times, and Bloomberg 
BusinessWeek.  These news outlets include daily stories on current economic and 
political events in European nations and frequently include articles on the Eurozone 
crisis.  In addition, the editorial sections of these newspapers include opinion pieces 
written by leading European officials and business leaders, such as an article composed 
by Wolfgang Schäuble, the German finance minister, in the Financial Times in 2010, and 
a piece written by George Soros, the hedge fund pioneer who caused the collapse of the 
Bank of England, also in the Financial Times in 2010.11  Numerous articles covering a 
vast array of current German and Eurozone topics will be cited in this thesis. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis contains a case study of why Germany has undertaken the leadership 
role in the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.  In determining the motives for this action, a 
historical study will be conducted to examine the country’s economic experiences during 
the early part of the twentieth century and the steps the country took after World War II 
to become an economic leader in Europe.  This work will also include a comparative 
study between Germany and the other nations in the Eurozone, to determine what the 
                                                 
11 John Authers, Europe’s Financial Crisis: A Short Guide to How the Euro Fell into Crisis and the 
Consequences for the World (Upper Saddle River, NJ: FT Press, 2013), 16–17. 
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peripheral nations did to get themselves into the current unsustainable debt situation and 
what Germany has sacrificed so far in the attempt to restore economic order.  In 
examining this comparison, political and economic trends should surface that will 
demonstrate what Germany has done correctly so far and what they must sacrifice in the 
future to ensure European financial stability. 
As research continues on this topic, additional primary sources will become 
valuable references of study.  These will include official German government and 
European institutions’ websites that include transcripts of speeches and policy press 
releases.  Such reference sources include the German Federal Government and the 
German Missions in the United States websites, the Eurozone Portal, the European 
Council site, the European Stability Mechanism website, and the European Central Bank 
homepage.  In addition, the need to frequently review the sources in this section, and 
those in the literature review section, will be vital to continually evaluate changing 
economic and political policy. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
To understand Germany’s political decisions since 2007 regarding the Eurozone 
crisis, a historical review of economic actions and policy will be conducted and an 
evaluation of current economic institutions will be performed.  In addition, Germany’s 
relationship with Eurozone members and the response the country received after the first 
round of rescue packages will be studied.  Once these historical and external factors are 
examined, an analysis of Germany’s current economic and political state of affairs may 
be explored.  After investigating the country’s motives for the contributions and 
sacrifices it has made to date for the Eurozone crisis, a discussion may follow regarding 
future German options.  Most notably, this will include an analysis if the country should 
continue in or exit the Eurozone and the possible consequences of each option. 
In keeping with this theme, this thesis opens with an introduction of the current 
state of the Eurozone crisis and why it is as much about politics as it is about economics.  
The second chapter will discuss a history of European economic integration, to include 
the various treaties, unions, and pacts that have been ratified throughout the post-World 
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War II period.  This chapter will then examine what the Eurozone periphery member 
states did to contribute to the crisis.  The third chapter will discuss the current Eurozone 
crisis, to include a detailed account of the sovereign bailouts enacted to date and the 
financial aid packages that have been created to combat the crisis.  This chapter will also 
discuss the continuing role of the “Troika,” which is comprised of the European 
Commission, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank, and the 
vital role that these institutions play in this crisis.  This section will include the ECB’s 
objectives and limitations that were intentionally setup for the bank at its creation, and 
will discuss the role that Germany had in its formation.  This discussion will include an 
evaluation of the Securities Market Programme (SMP) and the Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) program that the European Central Bank initiated in response to the 
crisis.   
The fourth chapter will discuss the German nation state, dividing the examination 
into the historical aspect and experiences of the country in the twentieth century, and the 
current role the nation has found itself in as a result of the ongoing economic situation.  
This chapter will examine the critical period of the 1950s, the age of German 
reunification, and the conditions created after the implementation of the euro.  This 
section will also discuss the role of German institutions, including the Bundesbank, and 
the evolving role of German leadership and the nation’s citizens.  The fifth chapter will 
discuss the options currently available to help resolve the ongoing sovereign debt crisis 
and the advantages and drawbacks of each alternative.  This will be followed with an 
evaluation of whether Germany should stay in or exit the Eurozone.  The economic and 
political ramifications of both options will be discussed, as well as the impact on the 
international community.  This will be followed with a conclusion that will reinforce the 
decision that Germany should remain in the Eurozone. This chapter will include topics 
for reflection, to include the relevance of the Eurozone crisis on the United States and the 
increasing threat to European stability triggered by the rise in Eurozone unemployment.  
This section will also include a discussion of what should be done so that this type of 
economic tragedy does not happen again in the future. 
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II. THE ROADMAP TO THE EUROZONE CRISIS 
This chapter will discuss the historical evolution that culminated in the creation of 
the Eurozone circa 1999.  This progression will be examined in terms of the treaties and 
pacts that the nation states agreed upon in the post-World War II period.  In addition, the 
underlying social and economic complications among the weaker member states, which 
have now become apparent in the throes of the crisis, will be addressed.  The euphoria 
present in the possible political and economic advancements that could be achieved in the 
post-World II era created an environment where agreements were made and possible 
negative consequences were overlooked, all in favor of the potential future for the 
European continent. 
As with many defining incidents of the past, whether they brought social and 
political upheaval, such as those instigated by the French Revolution, or economic 
calamity, as witnessed with the Great Depression, the ultimate event was the culmination 
of cascading actions and choices consciously and unconsciously made over a period of 
time.  King Louis XVI may have made different decisions prior to 1789 if he knew those 
choices would ultimately lead to his death a short time later. In this same approach, the 
U.S. Federal Reserve may not have contracted the money supply if it knew what would 
happen in 1929.  The current Eurozone sovereign debt crisis may be observed in this 
same manner.  One must consider if the 17 current Eurozone members would readily 
surrender sovereign monetary policy decisions and join an economic and monetary union 
if they knew this merger would fuel a crisis within a decade of its establishment?  But 
this is exactly what these nation states did, and what they now fight to preserve. 
A. EUROPEAN TREATIES 
Following World War II, Western leaders quickly realized that greater Western 
European integration would be necessary to break the continuous cycle of over five 
centuries of war.  To this end, Jean Monnet, a French political and economic adviser, 
arose to become a leader in the effort to bring former enemies, specifically France and 
Germany, closer together through economic integration.  His cause was the inspiration 
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behind the Schuman Plan, drafted by French foreign minister Robert Schuman in 1950, 
which proposed to create a common European institution that would manage the coal and 
steel industries of Western Europe.  These industries were identified as an essential 
ingredient for a domestic military buildup, as was witnessed in Germany in the years 
prior to World War II.  The Schuman Plan was presented on 9 May 1950, a date that is 
now regarded as the birth of the European Union and one that is annually celebrated as 
“Europe Day.”  On 18 April 1951, West Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, and Luxembourg signed the Treaty of Paris, which formally established the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).  This treaty also included the signing of 
the Europe Declaration, an agreement where the six members pledged their commitment 
to the first model of a supranational organization in Europe; a new concept where 
negotiated state power is surrendered to a higher authority.  This new authority consisted 
of an Assembly, a Council of Ministers, a High Authority, and a Court of Justice.  On the 
outside, the ECSC formed an economic union that controlled the vital raw materials 
needed to manufacture arms, but more significantly it designed the initial institutions 
necessary for a new political union between former enemies, and as a result, created the 
foundation for European integration.12 
The Messina Conference of June 1955 introduced the next major step toward 
European integration that culminated with the creation of the European Economic 
Community (EEC).  This conference endeavored to reverse the failure to implement the 
European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954, and to build upon the accomplishments 
realized with the ECSC.  In this effort, a series of meetings took place that culminated 
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(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2013), 474, 477; Johan Van Overtveldt, The End of the Euro: The Uneasy 
Future of the European Union (Chicago: Agate Publishing, 2011), 19; “The History of the European 
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These two proposals were agreed upon in March 1957, with the signing of the Treaty of 
Rome, which formally established the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom).13 
The Treaty of Rome is noteworthy in that it demonstrated the ability for the six 
original member states to overcome the failure of the recent defense initiative and agree 
upon a supranational collaboration dealing with economic reforms.  This allowed for the 
progression of European unity during a period of increased French conviction over 
national sovereignty and allowed for Germany and France to continue down the path of 
reconciliation.  As the preamble of the treaty declares, it is “determined to lay the 
foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe, resolved to ensure the 
economic and social progress of their countries by common action to eliminate the 
barriers which divide Europe.”14  This treaty served as a baseline for groundbreaking 
future agreements that are subsequently created as amendments to the Treaty of Rome.  
These include the Single European Act of 1986, the Maastricht treaty of 1992, and the 
2007 Treaty of Lisbon.  The Treaty of Rome, and the creation of the EEC and the 
Common Market, ushered in an era of growth as trade tariffs were removed and joint 
production initiatives were increased.15 
The next essential step towards a greater degree of integration was The Single 
European Act (SEA), signed in 1986, and which entered into force on 1 July 1987.  In the 
three decades since the creation of the EEC, membership had grown to 12 nations, with 
the inclusion of Denmark, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.  
The primary intent of this pact was to transform the Common Market into an internal 
European market, allowing for the free movement of goods, persons, services, and 
capital.  As the preamble of the SEA affirms, this treaty is “determined to improve the 
economic and social situation by extending common policies and pursuing new 
                                                 
13 “Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, EEC Treaty,” European Union, accessed 
April 17, 2013, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_eec_en.htm.  
14 “The Treaty of Rome,” European Commission, March 25, 1957, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf.  
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objectives, and to ensure a smoother functioning of the Communities.”16  The original 
model for this act was drafted by Hans Dietrich Genscher, the German Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, and his Italian counterpart, Emilio Colombo.  This opening of state 
borders highlighted the need for monetary coordination between members and continued 
the trend towards economic and political integration.17 
The Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed in Maastricht, the Netherlands, on 
7 February 1992, ushered in a framework for the post-Cold War era in Europe.  The 
agreement, now universally recognized as the Maastricht treaty, was motivated at the 
time of conception by a possible German reunification and the desire to enhance the 
Single European Act.  With the objective to introduce a new phase in European 
integration, the treaty introduced multiple new concepts for the member states.  First, the 
European Economic Community, which had persisted since 1957, became the European 
Community (EC) to highlight the inclusion of a political integration.  Second, the newly 
labeled European Union (EU) was assembled around three pillars: the European 
Communities, a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and new police and 
judicial cooperation among member states.  Next, the treaty created the novel concept of 
European citizenship over and above national citizenship and expanded the supranational 
powers of the European Parliament.  Finally, and most notably, the Maastricht treaty 
shaped the final stages of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which introduced 
the euro currency to the European Union.  As a result, the Maastricht treaty accelerated 
the continuing ideals of European integration and formed the criteria for membership into 
the Eurozone.18 
The establishment of the European Union in the Maastricht treaty combined 
previous initiatives and introduced new ones.  The European Communities pillar merged 
the newly christened European Community with the European Coal and Steel 
                                                 
16 “The Single European Act,” European Commission, February 17, 1986, 
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Community and the European Atomic Energy Community.  This new enterprise was 
formed around the fledgling concept of a supranational balance of powers, with the 
European Commission submitting proposals, the European Parliament and European 
Council approving decrees, and the Court of Justice monitoring compliance of passed 
measures.  The CFSP pillar builds upon the appeal introduced in the Single European Act 
for member states to work together on foreign policy, as it creates a program that 
promotes joint foreign policy.  The third pillar expands the joint law enforcement 
capabilities for member states in an attempt to provide a new level of protection for the 
European citizen who may move freely around the EU.  These three pillars functioned to 
increase the political dimension of the new treaty.19 
The freshly minted Economic and Monetary Union created a three stage 
progression for European Union countries to enter the Eurozone.  The first stage, which 
commenced on 1 July 1990, removed all restrictions on the movement of capital between 
member states.  In addition, the member’s central banks increased their cooperation on 
monetary policies with the intent of achieving price stability within the union.  The 
second stage, which began on 1 January 1994, commenced with the establishment of the 
European Monetary Institute (EMI), which was a precursor to the European Central Bank 
(ECB).  The EMI was tasked with strengthening central bank cooperation and monetary 
policy coordination, and to make preparations for a single monetary policy.  During this 
phase, the euro was named, exchange rates with non-participating EU members were 
negotiated, and conversion rates for euro members were agreed upon.  In addition, the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was adopted in June 1997, and the initial members who 
qualified for the Eurozone were announced.  Lastly, the European Central Bank was 
established on 1 June 1998, and operations were transferred from the EMI to the ECB.  In 
the 1990s, as the wickets of success were being checked off for the first two stages of the 
EMU, a fundamental flaw regarding membership into the third stage was being glossed 
over, one that would be exposed during the first sign of monetary hardship.20 
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The third stage of the EMU commenced on 1 January 1999, with the introduction 
of the euro.  On this day, the exchange and conversion rates were locked into place and 
the ECB took over coordination of a single monetary policy for the Eurozone.  On 1 
January 1999, 11 European Union states qualified for the third EMU stage and became 
founding members of the Eurozone:  Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.  Two additional 
European Union members, the United Kingdom and Denmark, qualified for Eurozone 
membership but declined.  Six additional nation states have since met the requirements 
for membership:  Greece joined on 1 January 2001; Slovenia became the 13th member on 
1 January 2007; Cyprus and Malta qualified on 1 January 2008; Slovakia became the 
16th member one year later; and Estonia joined on 1 January 2011.  This brings the 
current Eurozone membership to 17 of the 28 EU member states.  All members of the 
European Union, with the exception of the U.K. and Denmark, are expected to join the 
Eurozone.  The remaining nine members continue to receive deferments until they fulfill 
the necessary economic and legal requirements for membership.21 
Acceptance into the third stage of the EMU is based upon fulfilling the four 
conditions listed in the Maastricht criteria, also regarded as the convergence criteria.  
Candidate EU members are tasked with meeting the four economic and financial 
conditions, which include a high degree of price stability, the sustainability of 
government finances, participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European 
Monetary System, and the durability of long-term interest rate levels.22  The benchmarks 
for these criteria were ultimately negotiated as follows:  inflation could not exceed that of 
the three best performing member states by more than 1.5 percent a year; budget deficits 
must be no more than three percent of GDP; candidates must maintain a debt-to-GDP 
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 19 
ratio of less than 60 percent; and long-term interest rates must not be greater than two 
percent above the average of the three best performing member states.23 
As the EU leadership pressed to add nation states to the Eurozone, various aspects 
of the convergence criteria were disregarded for potential membership, while other 
candidates falsely reported financial data to create favorable statistics.  In this economic 
boom period of the new century, the negative long-term potentials were simply 
disregarded for the short-term economic and political gains.  In this era, living standards 
were dramatically increasing and an aura of European cooperation and potential 
economic dominance was prevailing.  On the day the Eurozone began, two of the 11 
members, Belgium and Italy, had debt-to-GDP ratios above the allowed 60 percent 
threshold.  Two years later, Greece was permitted admission with a debt ratio above the 
maximum allowed.  In addition, in December 2009, recently elected Greek Prime 
Minister George Papandreu announced that the former government had under-reported its 
budget deficit figures to help gain stage three entry.  In this infancy stage of the 
Eurozone, politicians chose to focus on the chance for success rather than make the 
rational decisions that may have avoided the future crisis.24 
In a well-intentioned effort to ensure that EMU members maintain fiscal 
discipline and preserve the monetary stability of the Eurozone, the EU passed the 
Stability and Growth Pact.  German finance minister Theo Waigel initially proposed the 
SGP in an attempt to limit the inflationary pressure that members could exert on the 
Eurozone.  This agreement created a monitoring and enforcement mechanism for the 
EMU, through the passage of the “preventive arm” regulation, enacted on 1 July 1998, 
and the “corrective arm” regulation, which entered into force on the opening day of the 
Eurozone.  Since all members of the European Union are enrolled in the EMU, they all 
are also legally obligated to the SGP, as defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU).  This pact enforces key aspects of the convergence criteria, 
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including the maintenance of budget deficits to no more than three percent of GDP, and 
the preservation of a debt-to-GDP ratio of less than 60 percent.  A higher debt ratio that is 
noticeably declining towards the 60 percent limit is also acceptable.  Member states are 
obligated to submit an annual report on compliance, while the European Commission and 
the Council of Ministers are tasked with monitoring the fiscal conditions of Eurozone 
members.  If a country is out of compliance, the SGP calls for an Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP) to be enacted to assist the member back into compliance, and if this is 
deemed as unsuccessful, economic sanctions may be imposed.  The Stability and Growth 
Pact created the rules and identified the consequences if they were not followed, but 
unfortunately it did not create a mentality to enforce those rules when they were soon 
broken.25 
In the period prior to the Eurozone crisis, the Council of Ministers and the 
European Commission knowingly overlooked multiple violations of the SGP.  In 2004, 
the overall debt-to-GDP ratio of the EU was 62.4 percent and increased to 63.4 percent in 
2005.26  In 2007, in the months prior to the onset of the financial crisis, the debt ratio for 
Greece was 105 percent, while Italy had a debt ratio of 106 percent.  At the same time, 
Portugal’s ratio had climbed to 68 percent, Germany’s reached 65 percent, and France 
realized 64 percent government debt.  Before the crisis hit, 25 of the 27 EU members 
violated the 60 percent limit agreed upon for Eurozone entry, and which was allowed per 
the Stability and Growth Pact.27  As Jason Manolopoulos succinctly surmises, “There 
was shockingly weak due diligence in assessing suitability for entry into the euro, and an 
equally weak application of the few rules that were supposed to police its operation.”28  
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This era of continued economic gains and an unprecedented liquidity boom created the 
mentality that these limits could be violated as long as growth and prosperity prevailed.29 
The Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007, signified a political 
compromise between the 27 EU member states in the wake of the failure to ratify a 
European Constitution.  The supranational Constitution, which the member states’ 
leadership approved and signed on 29 October 2004, ultimately failed at the national 
level in the ratification process, and in doing so, extinguished the greatest opportunity for 
a United States of Europe.  As an alternative to a broad constitutional treaty, EU leaders 
instead amended the Treaty of Rome and the Maastricht treaty to create the new Treaty of 
Lisbon.  This new agreement entered into force on 1 December 2009, and introduced 
sweeping reforms to the structure and the functions within the EU.  The treaty created “a 
more democratic and transparent Europe; a more efficient Europe; a Europe of rights and 
values, freedom, solidarity and security; and a Europe as an actor on the global stage.”30  
From an economic perspective the treaty designated the European Central Bank as an 
official EU institution, strengthened the supervisory role of the commission, and 
specified that only Eurozone members may decide EU monetary policy matters.  These 
amendments created a focal point for decision-making from which further reforms will be 
necessary to resolve the Eurozone crisis.31     
B. THE FAULTS OF THE NATION STATE 
The constraints and inadequacies of the treaties enacted before the Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis present only one-half of the overall equation that created an 
environment susceptible to fiscal crisis.  The second part rests on the political and 
economic decisions that the nation states of Europe made in this period.  With one 
proclamation, the Eurozone brought together nations that incorporated a wide diversity of 
history, cultures, and beliefs that have been ingrained into the populaces over an 
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expansive timeline.  In addition, many of these nation states were exposed to new and 
recently unimaginable economic prospects.  Politicians, capitalists, and later ordinary 
citizens hastily embraced the new opportunities placed before them, many times without 
understanding the full fiscal consequences of their actions.  As a result, when an 
unanticipated obstacle moved in front of the Eurozone economic train, it did not have the 
brakes or distance to stop before impact. 
The economic crisis immediately caused problems for those nation states located 
on the periphery of the union, and as such, soon created a division within the Eurozone of 
those states at the “core,” which exhibited greater financial stability, and those nations on 
the “periphery,” which did not.  These core countries were soon identified as Germany, 
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, while the periphery states included Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (GIIPS).  The periphery states have unique, but at 
times, similar circumstances and economic policies that led to crisis. 
The Greek crisis has roots in a historical aspect but also stems from symbolic 
modernization projects that the country undertook.  The non-industrialized Balkan 
country, with its strategic location in Southeast Europe, was readily accepted into the 
post-World War II European community as a counter to the spread of communism.  The 
country joined the EEC in 1981, with a national income level that had only reached 64 
percent of the Western European average.  In the years that followed, Greece attempted 
to hastily grow its economy in an effort to become an equal on the European stage, all 
while contending with a deep tradition of corruption, cronyism, and tax evasion.  The 
country also rapidly created and expanded its welfare system, and at the same time, 
reduced the retirement age to 58 years and installed full pensions for 35 years of service.  
For those employed, wages rose five percent annually, a rate twice as fast as the EU 
average.  As a result, from 2000 to 2008, government expenditures increased by 87 
percent, while revenues increased only 31 percent.  To offset the difference, Greece 
 23 
turned towards borrowing large sums of money, which was revealed as the nation’s 
public debt reached 160 percent of GDP in January 2012.32 
The 2004 Athens Olympics also created a severe economic hardship for Greece 
that served as a catalyst for economic disaster.  The original budget for the games was set 
at €2.5 billion, but once construction began, it was increased to €4.6 billion.  In addition, 
€1.3 billion was allocated to modernize the city’s transportation system for the event and 
€600 million was assigned to build the Olympic village.  As the opening ceremonies 
began, the cost of the games had skyrocketed to €10 billion and consumed four percent of 
the Greek GDP.  More significantly, in order to pay for the event, the country borrowed 
the money from foreign lenders.  This catapulted the country’s national debt and 
repayment responsibilities.33 
In contrast to Greece, Ireland’s economic troubles originated in the private sector, 
through irresponsible borrowing and spending, and with an unsustainable real estate 
market.  Ireland joined the EEC in 1973, in a period when the country trailed behind 
other modernizing European nations, and at a time when the country heavily depended 
upon Britain for economic support.  This era witnessed a per capita GDP that totaled only 
37 percent of the EEC average.  Upon entry into the Community, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) propelled the country from a laggard to a leadership position as the 
economy was modernized and export-focused industry rapidly expanded.  This success 
quickly led to an increase in personal income and created new economic fortunes.  By 
2005, the per capita GDP for Ireland had surpassed the Eurozone average by 53 percent, 
creating an unprecedented “rags to riches” scenario for the country.34 
As with any rapid increase in disposable income, the populace is confronted with 
two choices for their earnings, either save it or spend it.  Irish citizens decided to spend 
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their new found wealth at unprecedented levels, focusing on the purchasing of new 
homes and increasing their consumption habits.  As Ivan Berend notes, “People wanted 
to enjoy and exploit this great historical luck, and they started consuming and buying in a 
way that generations of Irish people had only dreamed about.”35  This aspiration, coupled 
with artificially low interest rates and unlimited bank lending, created a huge building 
boom in the nation. At the same time, household debt increased dramatically, climbing 
from 60 percent to 160 percent of GDP at the pinnacle before the crisis hit.36   
Enduring regional differences within the country, and fiscal measures that got out 
of control, contributed largely to Italy’s sovereign debt crisis.  Even after the nation was 
unified in 1861, the country continued to experience a fracture between the prosperous 
north, which experienced three percent annual growth before the crisis, and the lagging 
south, which declined two percent annually.  Additionally, youth unemployment reached 
40 percent in the southern region of Italy.  Overall, for a majority of the period after the 
introduction of the euro, the country was caught in economic stagnation.37 
To offset the lack of government revenues caused by a weak economy, Italian 
leaders resorted to borrowing money to run the country.  Undeserving low yields and low 
interest rates on government bonds stoked the country’s borrowing policy that rapidly led 
to an increase in public debt.  In the years preceding the introduction of the third stage of 
the EMU, the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio reached 120 percent.  At the start of the 
Eurozone crisis, Italy had the world’s third-largest public debt level.  As the crisis 
persisted, Italy’s public debt reached five times the size of the Greek debt and equaled 
three times the size of the combined Icelandic, Greek, and Irish debt levels.38 
The Iberian Peninsula similarly contributed to the Eurozone crisis as a result of 
complications from within.  The nation of Portugal also suffered from a weak economy 
prior to the introduction of the euro.  In 1986, when the country joined the EEC, its per 
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capita GDP level was only 57 percent of the Community’s average.  At the start of the 
Eurozone, this level had only risen to 65 percent of the overall average.  In addition, 
throughout the decade prior to the crisis, the nation’s calculated purchasing power and 
global competitiveness index continually lagged behind the other EU countries.39 
Portugal followed the same path taken by many nations during the 2000s, 
allowing its residents easy access to low interest borrowing and generous lines of credit.  
In this regard, the populace attempted to join the wave of increased European living 
standards with money it did not have.  The Portuguese government also resorted to 
borrowing large sums of money to compensate for a sluggish economy.  The country’s 
debt-to-GDP ratio reached 76 percent in 2009, and continued to increase, reaching 112 
percent in 2012.  In another troubling economic sign, Portugal’s budget deficit surpassed 
the three percent legal limit, reaching 9.4 percent in the summer of 2010.40    
The contributing factors that led to the Spanish economic crisis stem from the 
regional autonomy that exists within the government structure and the rise in 
consumerism, which included an increase in the demand for real estate.  The federal 
government did not show signs of distress as the country’s debt ratio remained at 40 
percent throughout 2007, and which later only increased to 53 percent by 2010.  This 
suitable level was misleading as the 17 regions of the country were primarily responsible 
for costly government social programs, and as such, rapidly accumulated huge public 
deficits.  By 2010, regional debt had reached $114 billion, and only one year later, 
climbed to $176 billion.  In addition, the regional governments were responsible for the 
local banking sector and had to allocate large sums of money in an attempt to keep these 
institutions afloat.  Even with the economic aid, this era witnessed 27 of these regional 
banks go into default.41 
As witnessed in other EU countries, wages in Spain also climbed at unwarranted 
rates, which created excesses for consumer spending.  The per capita GDP for the country 
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tripled in the three decades prior to the economic crisis and income levels rose from 50 
percent to 81 percent of the Eurozone average.  Comparable with Ireland, the populace of 
Spain also focused their new found wealth on buying homes.  At the height of the real 
estate bubble in the late 2000s, 80 percent of Spaniards owned their own homes, while 
banks offered 40 and 50 year variable rate mortgages.  In this period, the resultant real 
estate and construction industry rose to encompass 20 percent of Spain’s GDP and 
employed one-sixth of the country’s work force.  This substantial focus on one sector 
contributed to the rapid rise in unemployment once the economic crisis hit.  In the first 
quarter of 2013, unemployment in Spain reached 27.2 percent overall, while youth 
unemployment reached 45 percent.  More astonishingly, these figures equate to over six 
million Spaniards who are recently out of a job.42 
The imperfections residing in the post-World War II European treaties, and the 
overwhelming opportunities generated in the periphery nation states, created a recipe for 
disaster for the Eurozone.  At times, the proper models for success were agreed upon and 
put into place, but were not universally applied.  This was demonstrated by the failure to 
collectively enforce the four conditions required for entry into the third stage of the EMU 
and the ensuing Stability and Growth Pact.  In this regard, politics triumphed over 
economic trepidations, and in doing so, created a dangerous precedence within the Union.  
At the same time, domestic lawmakers failed to regulate the out-of-control spending 
habits within their nations and instead participated in the easy access to money. The 
impact of the crisis would not have been so severe if Spanish regulators had halted 40 and 
50 year mortgages or if Greek leaders had not resorted to massive borrowing to sustain 
their government.  These and the other factors identified in the above chapter, ultimately 
led to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and created an environment where a previously 
war-torn country was forced to accept the responsibility to bailout the others.43     
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III. THE EUROZONE CRISIS 
The financial calamity emanating from the United States provided the catalyst for 
a European economic crisis.  In April 2007, New Century Financial, an American 
subprime mortgage company, filed for bankruptcy and in turn set off the U.S. subprime 
mortgage crisis.  This event was followed with the high profile March 2008 government 
rescue of Bear Stearns and the subsequent decision to allow Lehman Brothers to go into 
bankruptcy in September 2008.  In turn, the New York Stock Exchange responded with a 
54 percent decline in value in less than one year.  The nearly decade long practice of 
high-risk borrowing and lending, and the inevitable bursting of the worldwide real estate 
bubble, created an immediate domino effect that seized the globalized economy as in 
1929.44 
The subsequent economic crisis spawned massive financial bailouts around the 
world that included sizeable rescue packages within the Eurozone.  In the ensuing years, 
the European Union, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Central 
Bank committed immense sums of money in an attempt to quell the crisis.  These steps 
slowed the negative economic slide, but have not as of yet created a permanent solution.  
In addition, high levels of public debt and government deficits have persisted and 
weaknesses within the European banking system have been revealed.  Finally, a 
continuing lack of economic growth, and persistent trade deficits in the periphery states, 
has accelerated a dangerous upsurge in regional unemployment and social unrest.  As 
Robert Zoellick, President of the World Bank accurately observed in 2009, “What began 
as a great financial crisis and became a great economic crisis is now becoming a great 
crisis of unemployment.”45 
This chapter will delve into the turmoil that ensued following the summer of 
2007.  The rescue packages that were assembled and distributed will be discussed, as well 
as the apparatuses created in response to the crisis.  These include the European Financial 
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Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).  The 
unanticipated repercussion of Eurozone members not having the ability to devalue their 
currency at the national level, and the shortcomings of austerity measures and structural 
reforms will be examined.  In addition, the vital role of the Troika will be discussed, as 
will the evolving participation of the European Central Bank.  This will include the 
treaty-enacted restrictions placed upon the ECB, as well as the political pressures 
emanating from the Eurozone leadership. 
A. SOVEREIGN BAILOUTS 
Upon reflection, the indicators of an impending financial crisis were clearly 
present in the Eurozone.  The failure to react to these red flags highlights the power of the 
political will for this Union to prosper at any cost.  In the period prior to the crisis, 
consumer borrowing and consumer debt expanded at a massive rate.  Household 
expenditures increased at a pace never realized before on the European continent, as 
consumers and institutions poured in money to fuel the real estate bubble.  While this was 
occurring, state governments increased their expenses while revenues decreased.  To 
offset the difference, nation’s simply borrowed money to compensate for the negative 
revenues.  In some countries, public debts surpassed the entire value of the nation’s GDP.  
In response, assurances were made and apathetic austerity measures were enacted to 
correct the imbalances.  These only worked to reduce domestic demand and created 
barriers for much needed growth.  As such, when lending dried-up and interest rates 
soared the situation rapidly deteriorated into a crisis.  An examination of the financial 
crisis that ensued within each of the GIIPS countries follows.  Additionally, the fiscal 
tragedy that spread from Greece to Cyprus is discussed.46 
The Greek sovereign debt crisis exploded with the government’s announcement 
of the false reporting of state finances.  In December 2009, Prime Minister Papandreu 
revealed that the budget deficit and the public debt were more than twice what had been 
previously reported.  Four months later, the EU Statistical Office announced that these 
new figures were still low and released a revised budget deficit for Greece of 13.6 
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percent.  Credit rating agencies soon followed by downgrading Greece to an eventual 
“junk rate” level, which rapidly increased the interest rates on government bonds.  In 
January 2010, two-year Greek bonds were being offered with a 3.47 percent interest rate.  
In July 2011, the interest rate on these type bonds increased to an unimaginable 26.65 
percent.47 
As a result of these unsustainable increases in interest rates and the decline in 
demand for Greek bonds, the government in 2010 could not meet its €50 billion in 
obligations.  In May of that year, the Eurozone and the IMF provided the first rescue 
package to the country, which included strict austerity measures and demands for 
structural reforms.  In response, the Greek government significantly increased existing 
tax levels, introduced new taxes, and restructured the level of tax-free incomes.  Wages 
were cut in the public sector, in some instances as much as 40 percent, and in the private 
sector by 14 percent.  The pension age in the country was increased and existing 
retirement payments were reduced by as much as 35 percent.  As Ivan Berend notes, 
“The government became paralyzed and a deep political crisis emerged.  Small and 
relatively far-away Greece shocked the entire European Union and the common 
currency.”48  The resultant austerity measures produced violent public demonstrations in 
the country, as unemployment jumped to 36 percent, and caused a devaluation of the euro 
on the international market. The crisis also led to the resignation of Prime Minister 
Papandreu, and resulted in the creation of a new temporary coalition government.49   
With strict austerity measures enacted and a deep recession continuing, Greece 
was once again unable to settle its debts in the first quarter of 2012.  This time the 
country required €30 billion to repay maturing bonds.  In March 2012, the Eurozone and 
the IMF provided Greece with an additional rescue package amounting to €40 billion.  
Once again, this provided the country with a stop-gap measure to prevent bankruptcy and 
temporarily prevented a possible withdrawal from the Eurozone.50 
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Ireland’s troubles began shortly before the U.S. financial crisis hit.  In 2006, the 
rapid rise in housing prices finally exceeded what a majority of the populace could 
afford.  In response, home prices immediately dropped 18 percent and continued in a 
steady decline downward.  Once the global crisis hit, home prices fell 50 percent and 
bank stock prices declined by 90 percent.  From April 2007 to February 2009, the Irish 
Stock Exchange plummeted over 80 percent.  Predictably, unemployment rapidly 
increased, reaching 15 percent in 2009.51 
In response to the economic calamity, Irish citizens rushed to the country’s banks 
to withdraw their savings, and in doing so created two nationwide bank runs.  The first, in 
2008, resulted in the withdrawal of €4 billion in deposits, while the second in 2010, 
witnessed the removal of €67 billion from the banking system.  The financial sector of 
Ireland was devastated.  As a result, in December 2010, the Eurozone and the IMF 
coordinated a second rescue package, this time for the Irish banking system in the amount 
of €85 billion.  Furthermore, the Irish government contributed an additional €64 billion 
towards the bank crisis.  The Eurozone bailout agreement once again incorporated drastic 
austerity measures that deeply affected the country.  In the end, the massive infusion of 
capital gradually improved the banking sector, and in 2012, the country showed signs of 
recovery.52 
Portugal’s economic difficulties came to an apex in the spring of 2011.  In the 
year prior to the Portuguese crisis, the country continued to believe it could solve its own 
economic problems, as state officials insisted that they would not need a bailout like 
Greece.  As the leadership held firm to this stance, public and private debt levels 
continued to rapidly increase and bond yields surged to unsustainable rates.  As a result, 
credit rating agencies downgraded the government bonds to junk levels, which only 
increased the fiscal pressures to unmanageable levels.53 
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The Portuguese government finally requested assistance after it could not meet its 
debt repayment options.  In response, in May 2011, the Eurozone and the IMF bailed out 
Portugal with a €80 billion rescue package.  This became the third Eurozone bailout in a 
one-year time period.  As with the other two rescue packages, strict austerity measures 
and structural reform initiatives were also incorporated into the Portuguese bailout.  
These attached conditions forced an environment of internal dissention within the nation 
as lawmakers had already rejected an austerity plan presented by Prime Minister Jose 
Socrates in 2010.  This previous debate became so contentious that it caused the Prime 
Minister to resign in defeat.  Once again, this third rescue package addressed the 
immediate issue, but it did not implement an amenable long-term solution.54 
The third smallest member of the Eurozone, the island nation Republic of Cyprus, 
became the fourth country that required a Eurozone bailout to avert a bankruptcy.  A 
central causal factor of the country’s crisis stemmed from the nation’s banking system, 
which had invested heavily in Greek bonds and subsequently incurred enormous losses 
when the Greek’s restructured their debt.  The nation also experienced a deep recession in 
2009 as a result of the global economic conditions and a drop in the country’s vital 
tourism industry.  This generated a rapid increase in unemployment that contributed to a 
corresponding increase in national debt.55 
Through the 1990s, the Cypriot banking system grew disproportionally to the 
country’s economic base, as a result of favorable banking practices and off-shore 
accounts.  At the height of the economic boom, the nation’s banking sector grew to eight 
times the size of the national economy.  To increase investments the government created 
a financial sector that incorporated low tax rates and high deposit interest rates.  As a 
result, the nation became the preferred location for the new Russian wealth that emerged 
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out of Boris Yeltsin’s economic reforms of the 1990s.  This substantial influx of Russian 
deposits magnified the banking system’s losses once the recession hit.56 
In 2012, with the increasing pressures on the Cypriot government to shield state 
bank losses, the major credit rating agencies downgraded the nation’s bond status to junk 
levels.  As was seen with the previous nations that received this downgrade, this crucial 
decision caused interest rates on government bonds to rise to unsustainable levels, and 
created a now frequent occurrence where the penalized country eventually could not meet 
its repayment deadlines.57 
In March 2013, the Eurozone and the IMF provided a €10 billion rescue package 
to the Mediterranean country of 800,000 people.  In an effort to appease the rising 
discontent among Eurozone member nations towards repeated bailouts, the Cyprus 
package included bail-in provisions, in which bank customers would contribute a portion 
towards the overall rescue fund.  As a result, the country was forced to close its second 
largest bank, the Laiki Bank, and transfer all assets to the nation’s largest bank, the Bank 
of Cyprus.  In addition, a tax was leveed on uninsured bank accounts of balances above 
100,000 euros with the intent to raise as much as €10 billion more for the rescue package.  
This bail-in provision may eventually encompass up to 60 percent of a balance on an 
account.  Additional austerity measures were enacted, which included reducing public 
sector salaries by up to 15 percent, reducing state pensions by 10 percent, and 
implementing new property taxes.  As resentment continues to grow towards the attached 
austerity measures, Cypriot parliament member George Perdikis tersely surmised the 
wave of discontent spreading throughout the periphery states: “Its [Cyprus] 
democratically elected representatives have a gun to their head to agree to a deal of 
enslavement.”58 
                                                 
56 Quentin Peel, “Germany Senses Unfairness Over Cyprus Plan,” Financial Times, April 2, 2013, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/30b6f06c-9baf-11e2-a820-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2PtVBLRd2.  
57 Harry Bradford, “Moody’s Downgrades Cyprus Credit Rating to Junk on Greek Exposure,” The 
Huffington Post, March 13, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/13/moodys-downgrades-cyprus-
credit-rating-greek-exposure_n_1341230.html.  
58 Michele Kambas, “Cyprus Bailout Scrapes Through Island’s Parliament,” Reuters, April 30, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/30/us-cyprus-parliament-bailout-idUSBRE93S12M20130430; 
Alderman, “Question of Aiding Cyprus Places Germany in a Bind.” 
 33 
The Italian and Spanish governments have not had to request a formal Eurozone 
bailout, but both member states have received alternate funding and have enacted strict 
austerity measures in response to the economic crisis.  In Italy, the debate over cost 
saving measures led to the resignation of the once popular three-term Prime Minister, 
Silvio Berlusconi.  The fresh Italian government was formed around the new prime 
minister and former economist, Mario Monti, who chose to continue harsh austerity 
measures.  In December 2011, Monti enacted a $40 billion austerity program that 
included reductions in pensions and increases in taxes.  In an attempt to offset the 
austerity cuts, one month later the new prime minister introduced a $7.1 billion 
infrastructure stimulus package.  The results highlight the suppressive power of austerity 
measures on an economy.  Two years after Monti took office, Italy continues to struggle 
as the cycle of recession has turned into a critical nationwide depression.  The enduring 
austerity measures have drastically impacted small companies and households as bank 
lending has faded and borrowing costs, which have recently reached the 10 percent 
interest rate level, continue to rise.59 
Spanish austerity measures have created continued hardship for the fourth largest 
Eurozone economy.  As a result of the crisis, the People’s Party decidedly defeated the 
incumbent Socialist Workers’ Party in the November 2011 national election.  The new 
Prime Minster, Mariano Rajoy, based his election campaign on the platform to turn the 
domestic economy around.  Upon taking office, the new administration announced a 
€16.5 billion austerity program, which included over €6 billion in increased taxes, and 
promised to enact comprehensive labor reforms. The new government’s efforts to turn 
around the economy have since been unsuccessful as the country’s five year long 
recession continues.  Spain currently has one out of every four citizens unemployed, the 
highest figure since the country transitioned to a democracy, and in the first time in 
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recorded history, the nation has witnessed a reduction in population as construction sector 
workers return to their country of origin.60 
B. RECOVERY AND RESCUE PACKAGES 
The five formal sovereign bailouts that took place between May 2010 and March 
2013 only represent the highpoints of the intense negotiations and massive funds that 
were allocated throughout this timeframe, all in the continued attempt to stabilize the 
Eurozone.  This period forced the financially stable member states to move to the 
forefront and provide funding to supplement the Union.  In return for these outlays, the 
stronger “core” members required the “periphery” states that were in receipt of aid to 
enact harsh austerity measures.  This requirement both helped and hurt the situation; it 
demonstrated to the citizens of the contributing nations that they are were not giving their 
money away for free, but at the same time, it forced drastic cuts in the receiving nations 
that has worked to suppress financial growth and economic recovery.  This is the 
conundrum that continues to work against a Eurozone recovery. 
Another issue with the early aid packages was the amount of the recovery funds, 
which only provided a piecemeal solution to a greater problem.  Although hindsight 
accentuates this point, at the time comparisons could be made towards other global 
recovery initiatives.  In 2008, at the height of the global economic crisis, all of the 
members of the EU, with the exception of Poland and Slovakia, were in a recession.  
Additionally, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania met the requirements of being in an 
economic depression.  In December 2008, the European Council approved the European 
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP), an EU stimulus program of €200 billion, which 
equated to 1.5 percent of the EU-wide GDP.  In contrast, the United States enacted the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), which provided a $787 billion 
stimulus program that equated to nearly five percent of the U.S. GDP.  This discrepancy 
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created a dispute between the EU and a group that consisted of the U.S., the IMF, and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD).  Indicative of the 
inherent weakness of the EU’s supranational governance, the member states resisted calls 
for a greater unified response, and instead chose to allow members to take additional 
actions at the sovereign level.  This crucial political decision, when the economic crisis 
was in its infancy, forced Eurozone members to attempt to combat the continuing crisis 
on their own.  As a divided union, they failed.61 
Throughout 2009, conditions continued to deteriorate in the Eurozone as member 
states were handcuffed in how they could respond.  This limitation highlighted a 
shortcoming of Eurozone membership; the inability to devalue one’s currency.  As 
members joined the third stage of the EMU, they surrendered sovereign monetary policy 
to the ECB and submitted to the bank’s controls and regulations.  As conditions got 
worse for the GIIPS countries, the ECB was forced into the position of a middleman 
between the stronger and weaker members.  As the stronger states were allocating the 
emergency funds, they gained the advantage in dictating policy, which included 
maintaining the status quo to inhibit the negative potentials of devaluation and controlling 
against the risk of inflation.  As budget deficits continued to increase in the periphery 
states, the state leadership could not use currency depreciation to improve their 
international price competitiveness and promote export-led domestic growth that would 
have quickly reduced their deficits.  Instead they were forced to change domestic 
policies, which included public sector cuts, pension reforms, wage reductions, and tax 
increases.  These austerity measures countered any potential for growth and forced the 
continuation of economic hardships.62 
In finalizing the Greek rescue package in May 2010, the Eurozone leadership 
realized that overall conditions were continuing to deteriorate and additional action was 
needed to stem the sovereign debt crisis.  As such, two precarious years after the EERP 
was approved, the Eurozone created the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF).  
The EFSF’s mandate “is to safeguard financial stability in Europe by providing financial 
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assistance to euro area Member States within the framework of a macro-economic 
adjustment programme.”63  To fund this program, the European Commission proposed 
the issuance of Eurobonds backed by a collective government guarantee of all Eurozone 
members.  German leadership was staunchly opposed to this idea and instead forced the 
concept of lending based on bilateral loans.  During the negotiation process, the EU’s 
legal representatives supported the German position, declaring that Eurobonds would 
require treaty changes.  This decision began the continuing debate on the need for 
Eurobonds to stabilize the continuing Eurozone crisis.64 
The EFSF was subsequently used to provide funding for the Irish, Portuguese, and 
second Greek rescue packages discussed above.  The agreement created a temporary 
rescue mechanism that was authorized to borrow up to €440 billion by issuing domestic 
bonds or other debt instruments that were based on the solid credit ratings of the core 
members.  In a move that demonstrated that Germany was emerging as the financial 
leader in the Eurozone, the country provided €119 billion, or 27 percent, to the overall 
fund.  The second largest contributor, France, contributed €89 billion, or 20 percent, to 
the EFSF.  Additionally, the IMF was permitted to contribute up to €250 billion in 
assistance.  Once again, this program was generally received as a partial solution, similar 
to the EERP, as lengthy negotiations between the EU and the potential recipient of funds 
became a prerequisite before aid was provided.  This created uncertainty in the bond 
market and inadvertently promoted volatile market speculation of a possible Eurozone 
break-up.65 
In an effort to instill confidence in the financial markets, in October 2010, the 
Eurozone’s leadership finally decided that a permanent rescue mechanism was needed for 
the Union.  To this end, the Eurozone introduced the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), which entered into force in October 2012.  This program sanctioned the European 
Commission to raise €60 billion in bonds, using the EU’s budget as collateral, and 
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directed the continued cooperation with the IMF.  As finalized in the negotiations, this 
program was also not to be categorized as Eurobonds but as a means to provide 
assistance to safeguard the financial stability of the Eurozone.  The ESM was soon called 
into action in December 2012, to allocate €39 billion to recapitalize the Spanish banking 
sector, and later in February 2013, to provide an additional €1.8 billion to the nation’s 
banking industry.66 
The EFSF and the ESM are scheduled to run concurrently through mid-2013, at 
which time the ESM will take over the primary role of providing all new financial 
assistance and the EFSF will only continue to manage its outstanding debts.  As a further 
sign of the continuing support for the Eurozone and of the increasing political institution-
building that is occurring within the Union, the ESM budget has been increased to €550 
billion through member obligations.  Once again, Germany has pledged to provide 27 
percent of the capital for this permanent bailout fund.67 
C. THE TROIKA 
The three members of the “Troika,” the European Commission, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Central Bank (ECB) have all played a crucial 
role in the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.  This label was created to symbolize the 
critical partnership that has formed between the three entities as they continue to combat 
the crisis through rescue packages and funding.  Each entity has authorized and allocated 
substantial resources to the bailout funds that have been distributed to date.  As this has 
occurred, the role of the ECB has noticeably evolved throughout this period to allow for 
an enhanced crisis response.68 
The European Commission has used its right of initiative to propose the recovery 
packages that became the EFSF and the ESM.  As these programs have increased in size, 
the commission has found itself controlling an unexpected and powerful European 
                                                 
66 Lynn, Bust, 178; “About ESM,” European Union, accessed May 8, 2013, 
http://www.esm.europa.eu/about/index.htm.  
67 “About ESM.” 
68 “The IMF and Europe,” International Monetary Fund, last modified April 9, 2013, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/europe.htm.  
 38 
monetary fund, which may be perceived as a rival to the IMF.69  The organization 
consists of a representative from each EU member state, but when dealing with the 
Eurozone crisis, a member’s share of the overall monetary contribution carries political 
weight.  As such, Germany has considerable influence over this leg of the Troika with its 
27 percent contribution to the rescue funds.  This has allowed German officials to attach 
strict austerity measures to the bailout packages and to halt the commission’s Eurobond 
initiative.70 
The International Monetary Fund, created from the Bretton Woods Conference of 
1944, was designed to assist in the challenges currently facing the Eurozone.  As the 
IMF’s objectives declare, “It provides policy advice and financing to members in 
economic difficulties.”71  The IMF has contributed over €77 billion to the Irish, 
Portuguese, Greek, and Cypriot rescue funds.  As a result, in April 2012, numerous IMF 
member nations pledged to provide over $430 billion in additional funding if the 
organization requires it for further Eurozone rescue programs.72 
Member nations contribute money to the IMF’s dispersal fund through a quota 
system.  The member’s size in the global economy defines its assigned quota, which in 
turn determines the country’s voting power within the organization.  The United States, 
having the largest global economy, contributes the most and has the highest voting share, 
set at 16.75 percent.  Germany has the third largest member state economy, and as a 
result, has a 5.81 percent share of total votes.  As there are 188 members of the IMF, the 
German delegation has a limited say in the conditions attached to the IMF funds used in 
the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.73 
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The European Central Bank has undertook a significant evolution since the start 
of the Eurozone crisis, as the organization has transformed from being a reluctant and 
proudly independent member to a more active participant of the Troika.  Upon its 
inception in June 1998, the ECB was originally mandated to combat inflation.  The TFEU 
clearly defines the purpose of the ECB:  “The primary objective of the European System 
of Central Banks…shall be to maintain price stability.”74  This anti-inflationary focus 
reveals the German influence over the ECB, as this ideal parallels that of the German 
central bank, the Bundesbank.75 
In the opening years of the Eurozone crisis, the ECB deliberately left the EU 
response to the European Commission.  This decision was in large part due to the TFEU 
directive that the ECB is not allowed to provide direct support to Eurozone governments.  
This changed in May 2010, when the ECB began to purchase Greek bonds in the effort to 
show support for the domestic bond market and in the attempt to bring interest rates 
down to a sustainable level.  Since then, the ECB’s Securities Market Programme (SMP) 
has continued its bond purchasing program with the subsequent purchase of Irish, 
Portuguese, and Cypriot bonds.  Additionally, the SMP has purchased Spanish and Italian 
bonds, which created an alternative rescue package for these two member states.  At the 
end of 2012, the SMP portfolio included €43.7 billion in Spanish debt and €99 billion in 
Italian bonds.76  As John Authers observes, a majority of EU politicians valued this 
program as it “was the easiest political way out, as the ECB had the power to print 
money—even if this risked inflation later on.”77  This program, however, has created 
friction between the ECB and German officials, as Germany believes this action is 
outside the original mandate of the ECB and threatens possible inflation.  In September 
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2011, Germany’s Juergen Stark, the ECB’s chief economist, resigned over disagreements 
with this bond purchasing program.78  
As the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis continues unabated, the ECB has 
intensified its discourse that it should become more involved in resolving the crisis.  In 
July 2012, the ECB’s President, Mario Draghi, firmly stated, “Within our mandate, the 
ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro.  And believe me, it will be 
enough.”79  In September 2012, Draghi followed through on his promise with the 
introduction of the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program.  The OMT 
was designed to replace the limited and unconditional restraints that were enacted on the 
SMP with a new unlimited and conditional program.  The potential size of this new bond-
buying program is unlimited but it also includes strict fiscal conditions for the receiving 
member state.  Although no country has yet to apply for the OMT program, its 
availability is attributed to a reduction in Eurozone market interest rates.  German 
leadership and the nation’s media has publicly criticized the OMT initiative, regarding it 
as a program that would write a “blank check” to a country and one that is a potential 
source for inflation.  This disapproval was formally acknowledged as Jens Weidmann, 
the Bundesbank president, became the only member of the ECB governing council to 
vote against the new program.  This crowning incident reveals the evolution that the ECB 
has undergone since the start of the Eurozone crisis.  Created in the image, and with the 
same objectives of the Bundesbank, German leadership has now openly criticized this 
once aligned EU institution.80 
The Eurozone sovereign debt crisis has had a tremendous impact on the European 
Union.  The once assumed unlimited growth and potential quickly turned into a 
tremendous hardship and expense.  The periphery countries of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
and Cyprus soon found that they did not have the money to sustain their nations.  This 
resulted in huge monetary rescue packages that also carried with them strict fiscal 
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policies of austerity and structural reforms.  The economic downturn has also 
dramatically impacted Italy and Spain, who have undertaken harsh reforms that have 
caused a dramatic rise in unemployment levels. 
The financial crisis forced the Eurozone member states and their affiliates to join 
together in an attempt to find a solution for the problem.  In doing this, the EU enacted 
the European Economic Recovery Plan, the European Financial Stability Facility, and the 
European Stability Mechanism.  All have successively increased the Eurozone members’ 
monetary commitments and time guarantees towards resolving the crisis. 
Lastly, the Eurozone crisis has caused the three members of the Troika, the 
European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank, 
to join together in the effort to fight the economic disaster.  The European Commission 
and the IMF quickly began to work together to create the sovereign rescue packages, 
while the ECB reluctantly transformed from a passive to an active member of the team.  
In doing this, the ECB has progressed from sponsoring the Securities Market Programme 
to the Outright Monetary Transaction program, all in the effort to quell the uncertainty in 
the European financial markets. 
As the Eurozone’s response has progressed, a distinction has arisen between the 
members who are financially capable of supporting the rescue measures and those who 
will continue to need support.  As such, Germany has arisen to take the leadership role 
with its continuing financial commitment to the EU.  The tumultuous history of the 
nation state and the perceived necessity for a long-lasting EU are both significant factors 
for this crucial Eurozone member state. 
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IV. THE ROLE OF GERMANY IN CRISIS 
The Federal Republic of Germany has recently emerged as the pivotal member of 
the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.  The country has provided substantial funds to the 
European Union, all in an effort to keep the Eurozone intact and the euro currency afloat, 
but also because such a goal is in the German national interest.  The trials and tribulations 
of the twentieth century help to present an understanding of this new role, which has been 
long in the making and in some sense signifies a return of Germany’s central role in the 
European political economy of the past.  The German social market economy that 
emerged in the postwar era enabled West Germany to overcome the devastation it had 
endured in the first half of the century, while it provided the foundation for the pursuit of 
the domestic and international goals of economic growth, employment, and price 
stability.  At the conclusion of the Cold War, the successful reunification of the German 
state enabled the country to continue with its export-oriented industrial growth.  The 
country would eventually emerge as the top European exporter and would only trail 
China in the overall global export market. 
A combination of tradition, thrift, good fortune, U.S. largesse, and an emphasis on 
manufactures, as well as social peace through what is more or less an egalitarian culture 
of the German population, have all contributed to the country’s economic success.  The 
Prussian, Schwabian, and otherwise traditions combined with the legacy of debt in the 
epoch of total war have reinforced the virtues of thrift, combined with what is also a deep 
skepticism of speculation in capitalism and a downright anti-money attitude among some 
in the middle class and surely within the working class.  The importance of this 
characteristic may be appreciated in the translation of the German word Schuld, which 
means both debt and guilt.81  Such moralization in the matter of fortune and economy 
also ensued through the burdens worked by the unification of Germany, with its huge 
load of transfer payments and debt in the rebuilding of the ex-GDR, an investment whose 
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wisdom showed itself assuredly in the wake of the 2007–2008 crisis.  One also looked 
mistrustfully, though often without good reason, at what was deemed rightly or wrongly 
to be the spendthrift habits of southern Europeans, especially Greeks, with whom the 
Germans have a long and rich bond of love and hate through the centuries.82 
Beginning in the 1970s, the West German government embarked itself on deficit 
spending and counter-cyclical measures in the face of the world economic challenges of 
the oil embargo years and stagflation.  In the recent past, though, the government of the 
Federal Republic of Germany has revived the customs of thrift for as much domestic 
political reasons as those of the European political economy.  Within the European 
Community and then European Union, the Germans had paid into the pot, while others 
had extracted benefits, similar to the circumstances within the FRG and the rich southern 
states (i.e., Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria), which had made tax contributions to the 
northern states that were less prosperous.  This process was then amplified after 
unification in 1990 and led to a current of discontent, especially within the rank and file 
of German voters who have silently borne this burden sharing over the past two decades.   
This German school of economic beliefs has created friction within the Eurozone 
as Germans expect fellow member states who receive their aid to now enact strict 
austerity measures and structural reforms, while those receiving German funds believe 
this request is too demanding.  As the German nation state continues to assume more 
political and economic responsibilities within the Eurozone, this disagreement will only 
become greater with time. 
This chapter will discuss the unique German experiences of the twentieth century 
that facilitated the beliefs and principles of the individual German citizen, and which 
formed the nation’s political response to the Eurozone crisis.  This influential era, and the 
institutions that arose out of the 1950s, will be discussed.  This will be followed with 
insight into the importance of German monetary stability and the posturing of German  
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industry towards an export-focused economy.  The successful German reunification will 
be addressed, as will the evolving role of the German nation state in the current financial 
crisis.  
A. THE GERMAN NATION STATE OF THE 20TH CENTURY 
The economic trials of the Weimar Republic (1919–1933) and the tyranny of the 
Third Reich (1933–1945) profoundly contributed to the character of the post-World War 
II West and East German economies, with the latter collapsing itself with the end of the 
Soviet system within Europe in 1990.  Having experienced the tumultuous era of 
economic calamity and totalitarianism, the two Germanies that emerged from the ruins of 
the Second World War were determined not to repeat the mistakes of the first half of the 
century.  In this effort, West German leadership developed an innovative economic 
system for the country, which became recognized as a social market economy, a more or 
less evolution from the economic system of the nineteenth century through the Third 
Reich.  This system incorporated a free market structure using some state controls, with a 
social dimension that was created to protect the rights of the worker as had more or less 
been the case in earlier periods as well, and which generated a bulwark against socialism 
in the GDR and the Soviet Union.  In addition, to counter the possibility of a new round 
of hyperinflation, German economics expert under the occupation, Dr. Ludwig Erhard, 
launched a currency reform program with the allies in June 1948 that introduced a new 
stabilizing currency, the Deutsche Mark, which presently became the foundation of the 
FRG.  As Patrick Boarman stated in 1964 of the successes of the new West German 
economic system, “Freedom in the realm of goods, discipline in the realm of money—
these were the twin pillars of a grandiose economic conception which … lifted Germany 
from the almost total desolation of the years 1945–48 to a level of sustained economic 
performance in the succeeding decade which was unmatched in the Western world.”83  
The adaptation and successful implementation of the West German social market 
economy, at a time of the advance in the Korean War and the transatlantic pact, created a 
competitive and vibrant economic system, but just as importantly implemented a social 
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partnership between industry and labor that was able to regulate the rise in wages as the 
economy matured.  Half a century later, the German social market economy, functioning 
in the wake of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s reforms, gave the country an advantage 
over its neighbors, as wages became an unsustainable drain on Eurozone periphery 
member state economies.84 
The West German social market economic expansion of the 1950s allowed the 
country to rapidly recover from its postwar devastation.  Between 1950 and 1955, the 
country experienced a nine percent annual increase in its gross national product (GNP).  
From 1955 to 1959, GNP grew at an average rate of 5.2 percent annually.  This growth 
rate was the highest in the European community and even surpassed that of the United 
States.  As a result, West Germany was able to combat the high unemployment rate of the 
postwar period and successfully to incorporate over 10 million incoming refugees from 
the Communist-controlled regions to the East.  As an indicator of success, the 
unemployment rate went from 10.3 percent at the start of the 1950s, down to 0.7 percent 
in 1962, and over six million new residential units were constructed for the growing 
population during this same period.85 
The achievements of the post-World War II era produced a tremendous benefit for 
the West German state and for Western Europe in the Common Market and the EC; it 
instilled a renewed sense of public confidence that hard work, skill, and monetary 
discipline would lead to prosperity and economic opportunities.  In addition, the success 
of the era strengthened the confidence of the populace towards government institutions, 
such as that of the Bundesbank and the stability of the Deutsche Mark.  This, in turn, 
promoted a rise in personal savings that infused money into the economy.  The 1950s 
also gave West Germans the opportunity to move beyond the traumatic memory of the 
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decade, and the stifling period of economic inflation that accompanied World War II.  
With this new confidence, and a continued respect for the past, the German recovery 
pressed forward.86 
Twenty years after the West German nation state started down the road of 
economic recovery, monetary policy was still at the forefront of concern for German 
citizens.  This economic fixation evolved into the political realm, where “the 
interconnections of finance and politics have become especially visible.”87  The 
advancements in the postwar period reinforced the benefits of sound economic policy, 
and in doing so, created a sovereign determination towards the goals of economic growth, 
employment, and price stability.  At a time when the first economic recession had 
darkened the prospects of the young FRG in the late 1960s, West German Chancellor 
Willy Brandt proclaimed in 1970, “This Administration is also aware that we can only 
assure social and political stability in a growing economy.”88  To sustain this economic 
growth, and its by-product of low unemployment, the West German government and the 
Bundesbank placed an emphasis on nurturing an export-based economy as the key to 
continued stability.  Of even greater concern than these first two goals was the pursuit of 
price stability within the economy.  In a 1970 poll, 76 percent of the West German 
population preferred price stability to economic growth.89   
This followed the strong anti-inflationary conviction that stable prices lead to 
social order within the nation state, and this order is necessary to prevent a reoccurrence 
of the events of the early twentieth century.  In essence, these goals became a German 
cultural identity in the continual effort to maintain an overall social-political-economic 
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order.90 These post-World War II economic goals continue to be an essential influence in 
the German response to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.91 
The striking reverent status that the West German populace bestowed upon the 
Bundesbank and its currency, the Deutsche Mark, highlighted the importance that was 
placed on sound economic policy.  Unlike other federal banks, the Bundesbank is seen as 
a guardian for all that Germany represents.  As Matthew Lynn proclaims, “It is more like 
a flag or an anthem or an ideal than a bank:  something to be respected, defended, even 
sometimes to be fought for.”92  The Bundesbank, which was only established in 1957, 
ultimately and firmly corrected the problems of its predecessors—the Reichsbank and the 
Bank Deutscher Länder.  The Reichsbank was created in 1876 to coordinate the monetary 
policy of the new German nation state.  This bank soon fell under the control of the 
federal government in the period before World War I and once again when the Fascist 
regime gained power.  The Reichsbank was responsible for poor monetary policy that 
contributed to the inflationary periods of the two World Wars and the hyperinflation of 
the 1920s.  To put the actual hardship German citizens had to endure into perspective, 
from July 1923 to November 1923 prices of German domestic goods increased by 850 
billion percent, and the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the German mark was 
set at 4.2 trillion marks to one dollar.93  The bank added to the financial chaos by 
introducing three different currencies during its tenure: the papermark, the rentenmark, 
and the reichsmark.  In 1948, the occupying powers of West Germany established the 
Bank Deutscher Länder in an attempt to improve the postwar economic conditions.  The 
greatest achievement of this bank was the introduction of the new currency, the Deutsche 
Mark.  This provisional government bank soon yielded to the domestic pressures for a 
German conceived national bank that would represent the ideals and convictions of the 
German nation.  This new institution became known as the Bundesbank.94 
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The immediate success of the Deutsche Mark in post-World War II Germany 
introduced an era of monetary stability for the war-weary population.  The currency soon 
became a symbol of strength and one of national pride for the German people.  As the 
nation’s economy evolved into an export-biased system, the Deutsche Mark held its value 
against the global domination of the U.S. dollar.  In contrast to the other leading 
European nations, including Britain, France, and Italy, which had to devalue their 
currencies against the dollar, the Deutsche Mark increased in value against the global 
currency.  Throughout the recession and inflationary periods from 1960 to 1998, the 
Deutsche Mark retained 30 percent of its original value.  In contrast, the U.S. dollar 
preserved 20 percent of its value, the French franc 13 percent, and the British pound only 
8.5 percent.  Understandably, as discussion began on the new EU monetary union, the 
German faction insisted that the new euro should be “a worthy successor to the 
indomitable deutschmark, the rock on which Germany’s postwar reconstruction had been 
built.”95  The enduring confidence of the Deutsche Mark throughout the second half of 
the twentieth century demonstrated that the currency had become the foundation for the 
successful German economy.96 
As financial success facilitated the rebuilding of the West German nation, and 
later a united country, the memory of the atrocities that accompanied World War II 
lingered in the minds of the German people.  In a similar belief that a strong German 
national bank and currency were essential to preventing a third world war within one 
century, citizens believed that integrating their country into the greater European 
community was critical to an enduring peace.  Jürgen Habermas, a prominent German 
philosopher, acutely stated this German mentality: “Within the constellation following 
the Second World War, the cautious pursuit of European unification was in the country’s 
interests because it wanted to return to the fold of civilised nations in the wake of the 
Holocaust.”97  In effect, the memory of World War II bestowed upon the German people 
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a sense of shame of what the nation had engaged in, and in doing so, forced a suppression 
of nationalism in order to promote the greater European good.  This mindset legitimized 
the acceptance of a new monetary union that was not entirely in the best interest of the 
German nation state.98 
Another significant event that contributed to the German support for the Eurozone 
was the reunification of the German nation at the end of the Cold War.  As the prospect 
of reunification arose after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, many European nations 
were opposed to the idea out of concern that a reunited German state would once again 
become the dominant power in the region.  Leading the opposition was British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher and French President François Mitterrand who voiced their 
concern over the idea in the latter part of 1989 and the early part of 1990.  In the end, 
Prime Minister Thatcher acquiesced to the plan after it was agreed that NATO could hold 
maneuvers in the former East German region, and President Mitterrand consented once 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl agreed to join the EMU, which included the future third 
stage of the euro.  As East and West Germany reunited, “The country had bought into the 
single currency, in part as a quid pro quo for the rest of Europe accepting the 
reunification of Germany without any protest.”99  With the ostensible agreement of the 
nation’s leadership and the citizens of the country, Germany proceeded forward with the 
implementation of the euro.100 
The negotiations for the creation of the euro program underscore the diversity 
inherent within the EU, as a debate soon arose concerning what type of euro would be 
created.  The German faction supported an anti-inflationary currency, based on the 
German Deutsche Mark, and a new central bank that would promote independent 
monetary policies similar to the Bundesbank.  The French contingent-led opposing bloc 
promoted a currency and central bank that was more conducive to political control, 
similar to the Bank of France.  The subsequent negotiations resulted in a compromise, 
which became the limits and controls detailed in the Stability and Growth Pact.  In 
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addition, the TFEU modeled the new ECB on the Bundesbank and included the 
declaration that it was illegal for member governments to attempt to influence bank 
policy.  Given these results, the Germans had a large political influence on the foundation 
of the new currency and on the bank that would control the Eurozone economy.101 
In the last year of the twentieth century, European integration took a large step 
forward, but unique sovereign core values persisted.  As was detailed above, many 
periphery member states continued their hazardous monetary policies that eventually 
became unsustainable.  In contrast, German citizens held firm to their financial beliefs 
that had produced the successes of the second half of the century.  As public and private 
debt skyrocketed around the globe and credit became the new purchasing standard, 
German citizens held to their principles of saving money, living within their means, and 
controlling the rise of wages.  This mentality is demonstrated by the statistic that the 82 
million citizens of Germany own 93 million debit cards, but only carry 20 million credit 
cards.  In contrast, the 300 million residents of the United States possess 1.5 billion credit 
cards.102  In addition, the business sector remained focused on cultivating its high-quality 
export-based industry and creating innovations to improve productivity.  This approach 
has allowed the country to become the leading manufacturer of automobiles within 
Europe, as it now produces nearly three times as many vehicles as its next competitor, 
France, and has created Europe’s favorite automobile brand, the German Volkswagen.103   
In the first decade of the new century, Germany became the second-largest 
exporter in the world, trailing only behind the massive low-end product export market of 
China.  The country experienced a rise in exports from 21 percent of GDP in 1970 to 47 
percent in 2008.104  In terms of productivity, the OECD calculated that Germans 
produced $55.30 in GDP for each hour they worked, which could be compared to the 
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periphery states of Greece and Portugal whose citizens produced $33.90 and $32.50 in 
GDP per hour during this period.105 
The success of the export-focused German economy progressively created a 
divergence in the balance sheets of the Eurozone member states.  This dynamic was 
reinforced by the increased demand for German goods throughout Europe.  As a result, 
the German economy experienced repeated trade surpluses, while the periphery Eurozone 
member states accumulated massive trade deficits throughout the 2000s.  This trend 
caused a financial unbalancing of the Eurozone, as Germany and the group of core 
member states maintained controlled growth and low inflation, while the periphery 
member states experienced fast growth and high inflation.  The financial crisis that began 
across the Atlantic created the spark that ignited the tinder under the precarious European 
system.106 
B. GERMANY’S UNEXPECTED POWER IN THE 21ST CENTURY   
The opening decade of the twenty-first century witnessed a transformation in the 
German nation state.  The ideas and beliefs that accompanied the recollection of the 
nation’s violent past gradually gave way to a new generation whose personal experiences 
were formed more from the successful reunification of the country than from the 
country’s destructive past.  As was occurring around the world, the members of the 
“greatest generation” were giving way to one that did not suffer through total war.107 
In Germany, the conciliatory political policy agenda gradually yielded to a more 
equitable and dynamic mindset.  After more than half a century, German citizens and the 
nation’s political leadership believed their country could once again promote a sense of 
nationalism on the European stage.  A defining moment in this evolution was the 2006 
FIFA World Cup soccer event that was held in Germany.  With a worldwide audience of 
over 30 billion people, Germans throughout the unified country exhibited their 
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nationalistic spirit by flying the country’s flag in support of the German team’s run for 
the World Cup.  The team finished in third place out of 32 contestants.108 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel conformed to this new persona in her rise to 
lead the German nation state in 2005.  The chancellor was born after World War II and 
was subsequently raised in East Germany.  She lived through the Cold War and 
experienced the success of German reunification, beginning her political life during the 
integration of the two states.  Merkel’s political position allowed her to observe the 
positive effects of the German conservative economic path that preceded the Eurozone 
crisis.  As such, her response to the economic calamity has held firm to the German 
principles that made the country the leader in the EU.  These beliefs have validated the 
ultimatum that requires strict austerity measures and domestic structural reforms before 
Germany would consent to extending rescue funds to insolvent Eurozone member states.  
In addition, these funds would only be provided at the last moment, in an effort to 
demonstrate to the beneficiary, and the entire European Union, that this was not easy 
money.  As political economist Waltraud Schelkle notes, Merkel’s “stubbornness was 
counterproductive for the European Union but indicates the tenacity of a politician 
holding on to an idea of limited state involvement.”109  Unwittingly, as sovereign core 
values do not change easily, this requirement created an influx of anti-German political 
demonstrations within those recipient countries that follow a more liberalized economic 
approach.110 
The thrifty mindset of the German population parallels that of their chancellor in 
believing that their hard earned money should not go easily to those counties who have 
not earned it.  The overall support for requiring structural reforms in recipient member 
states, in large part, originates from Germany’s own structural reforms that it had to 
endure in the early 2000s.  In an effort to reduce the country’s budget deficit, which in 
2003 had violated the limits enacted in the Stability and Growth Pact, Germany enacted 
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comprehensive pension, unemployment, social benefits, and wage reforms.  
Unemployment entitlements were cut from a maximum of 36 months down to 12 months, 
and a provision was added that a recipient had to accept any lawful job the labor agency 
offered them.  In addition, the federal retirement age was raised from 65 to 67 years.  To 
fight unemployment and subdue inflation, real wages for German workers were 
suppressed, and subsequently, are still near the same level that they were in 1999.111  As 
German citizens had to tolerate their own effective austerity measures it was only natural 
that they mandated this requirement upon those who received German money.112 
As the Eurozone sovereign debt crises expanded, Germany became the member 
state who was paying the majority of the EU’s bills.  This has created a malevolent cycle 
of protest within the Eurozone; periphery member states who receive monetary aid with 
strict conditions continue to protest against the austerity measures, while German citizens 
protest against the ostensibly ungrateful recipients who are receiving their hard earned 
money.  This struggle will continue as long as individual rescue packages continue to be 
distributed to member states, and is projected to gain political prominence with the 
upcoming fall 2013 German general elections.  This unintended consequence of the 
Eurozone bailout packages has worked to interject a renationalization of policy-making 
within individual member states that has driven a wedge into the original intent of greater 
European unification.113 
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V. OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The Eurozone sovereign debt crisis has exposed a fundamental political and 
economic flaw within the European Union:  The economic realities inherent within the 
diversity of the 17 member organization have damaged the political aspirations of the 
continent’s elites.  The decision now is what can and should be done in response to the 
crisis.  German leadership and the Troika powers have firmly committed to doing 
whatever is necessary to combat the economic disaster.114  While this rhetoric continues, 
citizens of the EU member states gradually intensify their disapproval towards the 
Eurozone state of affairs.  Opposition movements and nationalist political agendas are 
gaining strength throughout the Eurozone, as shown with the rise of the neo-fascist 
Golden Dawn political organization in Greece’s June 2012 national election, and the 
results from the February 2013 Italian general elections, where support for multiple 
political factions resulted in a hung parliament and no overall clear winner.115  
Additionally, residents of these economically depressed nations are venting their 
frustration through an increase in public protests against those holding the Eurozone 
purse-strings.  This has brought a dramatic increase in anti-EU and anti-German 
demonstrations that directly reference repressive World War II conditions.  As austerity 
measures continue to suppress national economies and unemployment gradually rises, 
this grass-roots opposition will steadily make it more difficult to implement a coalition-
sponsored political resolution.  As such, timely decisive action is critical to the future of 
the Eurozone. 
The Eurozone is at a proverbial crossroads, which brings with it tough decisions 
that will affect the future of the global economy.  In essence, the members have three 
options:  they may continue to “muddle through” the sovereign debt crisis, they may 
enact substantial reforms, or they may choose to splinter and break-up the Union.  Each 
choice will have a considerable short-term and long-term impact on Eurozone member 
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states and the global financial markets.  The first option is the course that the Eurozone 
political leadership has decided to undertake.  This decision has provided a patchwork of 
temporary monetary solutions, but has not created a decisive and enduring response that 
is needed to quell apprehensive investors and repair domestic finances.  The second 
option consists of substantial political reforms that focus on strengthening the 
supranational characteristic of the Eurozone and enacting a mutualization of sovereign 
debt in the form of Eurobonds.  Many member states are open to this possibility, save for 
the one that holds the greatest economic influence, Germany.  The third option introduces 
a variety of profound scenarios that would upset the very essence of the Eurozone.  This 
choice may result in one, or possibly multiple Eurozone member states reverting back to 
their national currencies.  It may also witness the creation of separate EU monetary 
zones, such as a North “core country” union and a South “periphery country” union, each 
with its own currency.116 
This chapter discusses the options that are available to the Eurozone community 
to combat the ongoing sovereign debt crisis.  The three options that are available to the 
monetary union each have substantial benefits and drawbacks.  In addition, an 
examination focusing on Germany will be conducted to evaluate if this nation state 
should stay in or exit the Eurozone.  As this chapter progresses, the candid prediction of 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel must remain at the forefront of thought:  “The euro is 
in danger.  If the euro fails, then Europe fails.  If we succeed, Europe will be stronger.  It 
is a question of survival.”117 
A. THE THREE ALTERNATIVES 
The current path that has been chosen for the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis is a 
result of political and economic compromise that has yielded short-term financial 
assistance and various rescue facilities, but has also created adverse domestic burdens 
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and does not provide for a concrete long-term solution.  The five government and one 
banking rescue package to date have committed over half a trillion euros to periphery 
member states.118  These funds were successful in covering bond commitments and 
immediate expenses but did nothing to combat trade imbalances or increase domestic 
economic growth.  In reality, the German-led austerity requirements attached to the 
assistance packages have stifled fiscal growth and promoted recessionary conditions 
within these fragile countries.  This has created the possibility that additional rescue 
packages will be needed in the future.119 
The current course of action has also included the before mentioned ECB outright 
monetary transactions program and discussion of creating a more encompassing 
Eurozone banking union with new budgetary rules.  The OMT program has been credited 
with increasing market confidence but distressed members may be reluctant to utilize the 
program as it also demands strict austerity measures.  Any discussion on banking reforms 
is positive, but once again, decisive action will produce greater results than drawn-out 
political deliberations.120 
The second choice, to enact Eurozone structural reforms, is the most politically 
challenging option, but carries the greatest potential for long-term stability.  Successful 
implementation will also create a stronger and more integrated Eurozone that will be 
properly positioned to represent the interests of the European Union on the global 
economic market.  As such, this option presents the ways and means of fulfilling the 
aspirations towards a heightened level of European integration first introduced over sixty 
years ago.121 
The fundamental barrier that must be overcome to enact this solution is the 
reluctance to surrender certain sovereign rights of the nation to a supranational entity.  
These include transferring state powers to the European Union institutions, notably the 
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European Commission and the European Parliament, and shifting banking controls to the 
European Central Bank.  Additionally, the ECB should be given the authority to purchase 
government bonds directly, which would enable it to act as a lender of last resort.  Once 
this is done, these organizations would take a proactive role in managing national budgets 
and overseeing state banking institutions.  Implementation of this course of action would 
require the unanimous support of Eurozone member state leadership and the necessity to 
form a public campaign in support of reform.  Member states would then need to 
incorporate the new arrangements and rules into their federal constitutions, and existing 
treaties would need to be updated, making this a permanent transformation.  This will 
present a significant challenge, considering the current state of conditions within the 
Eurozone and the reluctance of German leadership, but one that is similar to overcoming 
the opposition of retiring 17 national currencies.122 
The second part of these reforms must address the persistent outstanding balance 
of periphery member state debt, as this monetary anchor will prevent the EU economy 
from moving forward.  A decisive act that would stabilize this element is to collectivize 
the outstanding Eurozone sovereign debt through the issuance of Eurobonds.  This 
program would allow debtor member states to convert their existing government debt into 
a Eurozone level debt security.  Doing this would remove the possible risk that a weaker 
member state may default on their outstanding commitments, as all member states now 
share the responsibility of the debt.  This would immediately eliminate the persistent 
uncertainty factor that is present in the periphery member state’s bond markets and thus 
would remove the counterproductive risk premiums attached to these bonds.  As the 
stability of Eurobonds would likely be comparable to U.S. Treasury bonds, the periphery 
states would see a dramatic cost reduction in servicing this debt that would have lower 
yields and lower interest rates.  Governments could then use these savings to apply fiscal 
stimulus measures that are essential for economic growth.  This would release the 
periphery member states from the continuous repressive cycle inherent with austerity 
measures and high debt servicing levels.  As growth ensues, the Eurozone’s leadership 
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could then turn its focus to implementing structural reforms to increase the market 
competitiveness of the periphery states, which would further improve the overall 
condition of the European Union.123 
The German Council of Economic Experts, an official government advisory 
group, proposed an alternative to this comprehensive measure, with a program entitled 
the European Redemption Pact (ERP).  Instead of incorporating the entire sovereign debt 
into the Eurobond program, the ERP proposes allocating public debt levels above the 60 
percent threshold, referenced in the Stability and Growth Pact, to a common redemption 
bond fund.  In essence, this proposal offers a compromise in burden sharing as it forces 
member states to continue to be directly responsible for 60 percent of their sovereign 
debt, while it allows members to transfer debilitating excessive debt to a higher 
responsibility.124 
Unlike the unlimited Eurobond program, the ERP is designed to eliminate the 
comprehensive debt above the 60 percent SGP level for all participants within 20 to 25 
years.  In this regard, a member such as Greece that has a debt ratio in excess of 160 
percent of GDP would have higher payment obligations compared to Spain, whose debt 
ratio is near 70 percent.  In addition, as countries enact this long-term payment plan, they 
also carry the burden of not going over the 60 percent threshold again in the future.  The 
ERP addresses this issue with various proposals for a roll-in phase, creating nationally 
mandated debt brakes, and with a plan of how payments are calculated.125 
The ERP proposal incorporates the hazard of continuing restrictive economic 
pressures on weaker member states and on calculating the program’s success based on 
expectations about the future.  As is stated in the conclusion of the working paper, this 
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plan is “based on a set of assumptions about future growth rates and interest rates of 
bonds issued by sovereigns and under joint and several liability.”126  The long-term 
requirement of this program creates the potential for unforeseen economic conditions that 
may threaten the success of the European Redemption Pact decades down the road.127 
The third option for combatting the current sovereign debt crisis is for the 
Eurozone to cease in its current form.  The first prospect is for one or more current 
member states to surrender the euro and revert back to their previous national currency.  
In this scenario, either a stronger core country could exit or a weaker periphery state 
could depart.  The greatest benefit of this option would be for a periphery member state 
to exit the Eurozone and then enact a sovereign currency deprecation program to promote 
export-led economic growth.  If a core country withdrew, it would no longer be 
responsible for providing credit to the weaker member states and it would once again 
have the control to determine national monetary policy.128 
The second prospect is for the Eurozone to splinter into a core country union and 
a periphery country union, each with its own currency.  This alternative would reduce the 
economic diversity that is inherent in the 17 member organization, as it would better 
align the traditional political and economic priorities of the different European regions.  
In this scenario, the periphery economic union would attempt to devalue its new currency 
in relation to the stronger core country currency, once again in an effort to make its 
exports more competitive on global markets.129 
These presumed benefits seem to support a break-up of the Eurozone, but further 
reflection reveals that this third option would be detrimental to the members of the 
European Union and the global economy as a whole.  The Eurozone is the compilation of 
over 60 years of political negotiations focused on preventing another European war.  A 
collapse of the Eurozone would nullify the tremendous political gains that have been 
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made in the post-World War II era, the period after the conclusion of the Cold War, and 
the advancements in the age of globalization.  These gains have ushered in an unmatched 
period of European peace and stability on a continent that has recently endured 
“barbarism” and “bloodlands.”130  The disintegration of the Eurozone would promote 
nationalist ideals, create adverse political objectives, and stimulate potential military 
conflict within the region.131   
A Eurozone break-up would also potentially induce catastrophic conditions in 
multiple European countries through the spread of economic contagion.  If a periphery 
member state withdrew from the Union, foreign lenders would stop investing in other 
countries that they believe may also have to exit.  As a result, a domino effect would 
ensue where other periphery countries would also not be able to meet their debt 
commitments and would have to exit the Union.  This type of adverse effect has been 
experienced around the globe with notable incidents in South America, which started 
when Argentina defaulted on its debt payments, and in Asia, which began with a currency 
crisis in Thailand.  In this scenario, a large sum of monetary assistance would be required 
to attempt to stop the spread of contagion.  In the end, the forces acting against this effort 
may be too great to halt the economic and political turmoil that would follow.132 
Finally, if a periphery member state exited the Eurozone, there would be no 
guarantee that rather than a recovery, the country may continue in a recession or 
experience a more damaging economic depression.  The country would first incur a 
substantial expense in converting over to a new national currency.  The nation may also 
witness a collapse in the value of its new currency within the global monetary markets, 
and the nation may induce dramatic inflation in rapidly introducing the new currency 
without a proven fiscal program.133 
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A core country would likewise incur a tremendous cost in introducing a new 
sovereign currency, as well as inducing the economic and political damage that would 
result from leaving the Union.  The nation would also create a substantial stress on the 
European Union organization as the intent is for all EU members to become Eurozone 
members.  Further debate would have to ensue if this nation should stay in the EU or if it 
should also exit this organization.  This would be similar to the current debate that is 
occurring within Britain, as this country does not want to convert to the euro currency 
and instead is discussing the potential for exiting the EU.134 
A splintering of the Eurozone into two separate economic unions would introduce 
conflict within the EU and would dilute the economic power of the Eurozone on the 
global stage.  Once again, the intent of the EU was for the European community to come 
together as one economic union.  Two separate entities would introduce a conflict of 
interests into the Union and would create a north/south partition similar to a division 
observed in several countries throughout history that ultimately contributed to military 
conflict.  A separation of the Eurozone would also dilute the coordinated economic power 
of the membership, and would produce a move that would contradict the global trend of 
increasing economic cooperation and unity.  This desire for greater collaboration has 
been observed in the Asian markets as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) is attempting to form an economic community and with the continued success 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) trade initiative.135 
B. GERMANY’S FATE? 
The question of whether the Federal Republic of Germany should stay in or exit 
the Eurozone has recently arisen with the continuing Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.  In 
examining the two choices, consideration must be given to the political and economic  
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consequences of the decision. In addition to the reasons given above in discussing the 
three alternatives for the future of the Eurozone, specific reflection must be given to the 
German nation state. 
Germany has become a beacon of prosperity within the European community in 
large part due to the Eurozone.  The country has been able to substantially grow its export 
market due to the favorable exchange rates of the euro that must incorporate the weaker 
economies of the periphery states.  This has, in effect, given German businesses a global 
trading advantage and has allowed the country to enjoy continuous trade surpluses.  If the 
country reinstated the Deutsche Mark, the currency would presumably appreciate in 
relation to the euro and the legal tender would experience a new level of volatility not 
seen in the national currency since the early twentieth century.  The strong financial 
conditions have also generated a high demand for the nation’s debt securities, which has 
suppressed yields and interest rates, and at times, resulted in negative yields on German 
Bunds.  If the country exited the Eurozone, its costs to service government debt would 
increase and the strength of the country’s export market would dramatically decrease.136 
Continuing with this scenario, if the country were to exit the Eurozone, the 
German Bundesbank would suffer large monetary loses that could potentially unhinge the 
iconic stability of the institution and with it Germany itself.  As the country is the largest 
contributor to the EU financial assistance funds, the national bank is heavily leveraged in 
the recipient member states’ ability to honor their repayment commitments.  In addition, 
the Bundesbank has purchased large amounts of periphery government securities and 
member state bank debt in these rescue packages.  If Germany leaves the Union, the 
country’s national bank will be left with a large amount of devalued foreign assets in the 
ensuing Eurozone upheaval.  This could lead to the adverse economic conditions that the 
bank has sworn to prevent, including the possibility of substantial domestic inflation and 
high unemployment.137 
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The withdrawal of Germany from the Eurozone would leave a void in the Union 
that the organization may not be able to recover from.  The country has become the 
foremost creditor and a leader in the Eurozone, acting in many regards in a similar role to 
that of the IMF, providing the funds needed to sustain the weaker periphery states.  If this 
funding source was removed, one or more of the GIIPS members would most likely 
default on their debt, which would create the cascading effect of contagion.  It is unlikely 
that France or another core country would have the monetary ability to subdue the 
negative trend towards a total collapse of the Union.138 
A German exit from the Eurozone would also forfeit the strategic political 
position that the country now enjoys as a result of its economic contributions to the 
Union.  As the nation state is the largest monetary contributor to the Eurozone, it also 
enjoys a large amount of political influence within the organization.  This presents 
Germany with significant bargaining power to enact programs and reforms that coincide 
with the nation’s principles and beliefs.  In addition, the advantageous position within the 
EU allows the country to conduct its foreign policy agenda under the cover of the 
association.  If Germany were to leave the Eurozone it would be forced to negotiate 
foreign and economic policy as a single nation rather than as a leader in a continent-wide 
union.139 
Finally, a stout reason for Germany to remain in the Eurozone is the country’s 
duty to prevent a repeat of the first half of the twentieth century.  Germany is once again 
in a strong economic and industrialized position relative to its neighbors.  The country 
has a growing economic advantage and a robust export-built manufacturing base that has 
the ability to support a domestic policy agenda that could adversely affect others outside 
its borders.  Remaining in the Eurozone validates Germany’s commitment to a unified 
Europe, builds mutual trust, and strengthens the inherent alliance that the country has  
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with its neighbors.  As a result, Europe can focus on resolving the sovereign debt crisis 
and on improving the Eurozone’s fiscal condition rather than diverting attention to 
military security and build-up. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Eurozone sovereign debt crisis has torn the fabric of Europe.  The ongoing 
choices of policy made in response will determine if the danger is stabilized or if threat 
leads to an unrecoverable situation.  The continuing recession within the periphery zone 
area has created Eurozone-wide volatile reactions and demonstrations that have generated 
an image that harkens back to the turmoil of the early twentieth century.  The Eurozone 
governance, under the leadership of the German nation state, has the opportunity to use 
this crisis to enact the political reforms that are needed to create a viable and sustainable 
future. 
The deteriorating unemployment situation within the Eurozone membership 
demonstrates the need for a swift and decisive response to what is rapidly becoming the 
leading threat to the Union.  In April 2013, unemployment in the Eurozone rose to 12.2 
percent, reaching a level not previously seen during the ongoing crisis.  This total equates 
to 19.4 million unemployed Eurozone citizens and includes 3.6 million jobless under the 
age of 25.  In addition, there are two million more unemployed youth in the other EU 
states.  As history has shown, these levels of disenfranchised persons can quickly create 
radical and dangerous reform movements that lead to global conflict.140 
This work has examined the timeline of agreements and treaties enacted within 
the European community that culminated with the implementation of the Eurozone 
monetary union.  These evolving treaties demonstrate the steadfast political vision 
towards creating a unified and peaceful Europe, and one that culminates in an institution 
that ends the centuries of military conflict inherent within the region.  Unfortunately, 
political action did not accompany this political vision as these treaties transformed into a 
monetary and economic union that did not have the sufficient political integration to 
ensure success.  This has created a European crisis that is as much about politics as it is 
about economics. 
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The periphery member states’ intrinsic beliefs, and subsequent actions taken in 
the first decade of the twenty-first century, culminated in the Eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis.  Each country has a unique path that led to economic disaster, but all share the 
common trait of willfully choosing to spend more than they earned.  The enticingly low-
cost to borrow money permitted Greece, Italy, and Portugal to turn towards this source of 
income to provide funding to run their governments.  Irish and Spanish residents took 
advantage of the inexpensive borrowing opportunities to focus on the real estate market.  
Citizens of these periphery countries also attempted to use these favorable economic 
conditions to catapult themselves to a higher level of living standards, which until now 
had been beyond their means.  The collapse of the global financial markets that began in 
2007 brought an abrupt end to this monetary bliss as credit dried-up and debts 
skyrocketed. 
The ensuing economic crisis created the shocking possibility that a European 
country could go bankrupt in the twenty-first century.  From May 2010 through March 
2013, five sovereign rescue packages and one banking aid package totaling over half a 
trillion euros were needed to the keep the Eurozone afloat.  This financial assistance was 
only provided after the recipient nation agreed to strict austerity measures and internal 
structural reforms.  Although these requirements created short-term benefits towards the 
recipient’s balance sheet, in the long-term they have suppressed the economic recovery of 
the nation by forcing a decrease in domestic demand and creating barriers for growth.  
This has ultimately led to rising unemployment rates and the emergence of radical 
nationalistic movements and protests against the current political and economic 
conditions. 
In the continuing effort to combat the Eurozone crisis, three organizations have 
emerged at the forefront of the recovery effort: the European Commission, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank, collectively referred to as 
the Troika.  In the sovereign rescue packages provided to date, the Eurozone governance, 
under the leadership of the European Commission, provided financial aid jointly with the 
IMF.  Since the beginning of the disaster, the European Central Bank’s position in the 
economic crisis has evolved into taking a more proactive role.  Under the leadership of 
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ECB President Mario Draghi, the bank has moved beyond its original mandate of fighting 
inflation to first enacting the limited and unconditional Securities Market Programme to 
finally unveiling the unlimited and conditional Outright Monetary Transactions package.  
In December 2011 and February 2012, the ECB also provided member state’ banks with 
two aid packages, labeled long-term refinancing operations (LTROs), which provided 
800 Eurozone banks with an unprecedented one trillion euros in low-cost, three year 
loans.  The ECB will continue to play a vital role in the recovery of the Eurozone 
crisis.141 
The European Central Bank’s assistance would not have been as substantial 
without the Federal Republic of Germany’s contributions.  This nation state has arisen 
from the calamity of the early twentieth century to become a political and economic 
authority within the European Union.  The country has developed into the second largest 
manufacturing exporter in the world and has become the largest contributor to Eurozone 
rescue funds and financial aid programs.  As such, Germany has emerged as the leader of 
the Eurozone’s core member states, which has allowed the nation to imbed its 
conservative economic values into the monetary union and subsequent rescue packages. 
The 17 members of the Eurozone have three options for combatting the sovereign 
debt crisis:  they may continue to “muddle through” the crisis, they may enact substantial 
reforms, or they may choose to splinter and break-up the Union.  The leaders of the 
Eurozone have, so far, decided to take a largely reactive role, as they have only provided 
rescue funds as a member state was nearing bankruptcy.  The austerity measures attached 
to these aid packages have repressed the chance for a region-wide recovery.  The ECB 
aid programs have provided benefits to the Union, but are limited in their overall total 
potential without the full support of all Eurozone members, which includes most notably 
Germany. 
The current conditions within the Eurozone have presented an opportune time to 
enact substantial reforms that will position the organization for a successful future.  
Expanding economic division between the core and periphery member states, rising 
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unemployment, a persistent recession, and growing domestic discontent, all support the 
need to create a supranational political union that will supplant the existing economic 
organization.  In addition, the issuance of Eurobonds will free the periphery member 
states from their debilitating debt levels and allow them to focus on economic recovery 
and growth. 
As a result of the current crisis, one or more member states may be forced to exit 
the Eurozone, or the Union may experience a splintering into two factions.  Each option 
would go against the original intent that was inherent within the treaties created soon 
after World War II; all of which had the goal to create a more unified and integrated 
Europe that would be positioned to promote peace and prevent future regional military 
conflicts.  An exit of a current member state would also generate a tremendous economic 
cost to that nation, as well as potentially create a cycle of contagion that could destroy the 
Union.  Finally, as an eternal motive against this option, Ivan Berend wisely observes: 
“Nothing proves European solidarity better than that every troubled member country was 
saved during the five years of crisis.”142  Time will tell if this optimism holds true. 
The current situation and future possibilities for the Eurozone are of considerable 
importance to the United States.  The country has robust trade, investment, and financial 
ties with the European Community that would be adversely affected by a Eurozone 
economic catastrophe.  The U.S. exports about $400 billion in goods and services to 
Europe and has about one trillion dollars in foreign direct investments within the 
continent.  U.S. financial institutions also lend about five trillion dollars to European 
entities.  European nations also have large investments within the United States, as 
demonstrated by Germany’s $212 billion foreign direct investments within the U.S. in 
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investment relationship in the world.  A continuing crisis will severely upset this 
economic partnership and will directly affect American stock indices and domestic jobs 
that are linked to European businesses.144 
Just as the financial crisis that originated in the United States severely affected 
European institutions, a future disaster resulting from the continuing Eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis will quickly spread to the United States.  This would derail the slow financial 
recovery that is occurring with the American economic sector and possibly catapult the 
country back to the harsh economic conditions that were encountered in 2007–2008.  As 
such, the United States must continue its support of a Eurozone recovery through its 17 
percent share of IMF funding and through the U.S. Federal Reserve’s program of 
providing U.S. dollar swap lines with the European Central Bank.145 
In examining the choices presented to the Federal Republic of Germany, to either 
stay in or exit the Eurozone, the nation state will benefit more from remaining in the 
Union than it will from exiting the organization.  In terms of the direct economic cost, a 
report prepared by UBS Limited estimates the cost of Germany leaving the Eurozone at 
between €6,000 and €8,000 per German citizen in the first year and between €3,500 and 
€4,500 in subsequent years.  In contrast, the study estimates that it would only cost 
€1,000 per resident to bailout Greece, Ireland, and Portugal in their entirety.  These 
figures demonstrate the tremendous monetary cost for the largest European economy to 
depart the Union.146 
In addition to this outright financial cost, Germany would also suffer a 
tremendous political cost in exiting the Eurozone.  Throughout the post-World War II 
period, the country charted an acquiescent course in an attempt to atone for the anguish 
caused by its previous regimes.  Throughout the ensuing decades, the nation remained 
steadfast in its conservative economic policies and political beliefs.  In time, as the Cold 
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War ended, West Germany was faced with the new prospect of German reunification and 
the economic hardship of integrating an economically regressive East German state.  This 
was followed by the period of European monetary unity that encouraged unwise 
economic practices throughout the newly formed Eurozone community.  Even with these 
diversions, the country was able to transform itself to eventually become a leader, not 
only within the European community, but also on the global economic stage. 
If Germany left the Eurozone it would forfeit the political and economic strides 
the country has attained in the nearly seventy years since the end of World War II.  
Germany’s success has given the country the opportunity to transform from a secondary 
role into a leadership position with the European Union.  This has allowed the country to 
promote its domestic doctrine, but more importantly has given Germany the opportunity 
to sponsor a lasting legacy of European peace and economic prosperity. 
The distinguished Transatlantic Trends annual survey of 2012 presents a 
supporting atmosphere for German-led reforms.  Polling data reveals that 73 percent of 
German citizens are still steadfast supporters of their country’s EU membership, while 68 
percent approve of the government’s handling of economic policies.  In addition, only 26 
percent of Germans want to leave the Eurozone.  In support of the substantial reforms 
that are proposed to resolve the Eurozone crisis, 53 percent of Germans are in favor of 
giving more power to the EU to manage national economic and fiscal policies.  As the 
sovereign debt crisis lingers, this favorable polling data may decrease.  As such, timely 
action should be taken in light of the current supportive German environment.147 
Germany has the political influence and economic means to sponsor the needed 
transformation within the Eurozone.  If the Union remains on its current path, repressive 
austerity measures and fiscal disadvantages will continue to hinder the periphery member 
states.  As such, Germany and other core member states will be forced to continue to 
enact a piecemeal solution or risk a collapse of the Eurozone.  The German nation state 
has the chance to promote the political reforms and to endorse the economic relief 
packages that are needed to move Europe forward.  If the Federal Republic of Germany 
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accepts this ambitious challenge, the country has the potential to reverse the nation’s 
lasting impact on history, and in doing so, may transform the legacy of the German 
nation state from one remembered as creating the worst recent tragedy to one that enacted 
the greatest political reforms witnessed in the modern era. 
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